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GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING OF EMPLOYEES
Marc Chase McAllister*
Abstract
This Article examines employee location tracking through smart phone
apps and GPS devices attached to or embedded within an employee’s
personal or company vehicle. For each form of tracking, this Article provides
separate frameworks for employers to follow when conducting individual
employee misconduct investigations and when tracking an entire group of
employees for non-investigatory purposes. Beginning with GPS tracking for
individual misconduct investigations, this Article contends that such
tracking should be used only as a means to corroborate evidence that an
employee has committed a terminable offense, that an employer may resort
to this technique only after alternative investigative methods fail to generate
enough evidence to warrant disciplinary action, and that the tracking must
cease once the alleged wrongdoing has been corroborated. Turning to noninvestigatory forms of GPS tracking, such as the monitoring of an
employer’s entire fleet of taxi-cab or rideshare drivers, this Article proposes
that such tracking should be performed only for legitimate business purposes
and only if employees consent to the tracking in advance. Whether
performed for investigatory or non-investigatory purposes, this Article
further proposes that employers should avoid collecting GPS tracking data
while employees are off-duty. Finally, this Article addresses employee
tracking through smart phone apps, including employer-owned apps and
apps designed for time-keeping purposes. Because employees who use such
apps typically consent to the monitoring of their phone’s location, this
Article concludes that employees tracked in this manner cannot reasonably
expect privacy in such monitoring. As a result, this Article predicts that appbased employee tracking will not trigger Fourth Amendment protection, nor
will it be sufficient to sustain a privacy-related tort claim, such that
employers will typically not face civil liability for tracking employees
through smart phone apps.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines modern forms of location tracking by
employers, including the tracking of employees through GPS devices and
smartphone apps.
The starting point to this Article’s analysis is the established law
governing GPS tracking by law enforcement. In that context, the United
States Supreme Court recently ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies
when police attach a GPS tracking device to a criminal suspect’s vehicle
and use the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements.1 In effect, this
ruling established that when GPS tracking is conducted as part of a
criminal investigation, the procedure must be authorized by a warrant or
warrant exception.2
Like law enforcement officials, public employers must abide by the
Fourth Amendment,3 and private employers may be liable in tort for
invading an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, a concept
borrowed from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.4 Yet the Fourth
Amendment framework that governs employers differs somewhat from
1. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“‘Over and again this Court has
emphasized that’ . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))).
3. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
4. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
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that which governs law enforcement. In the employment context,
employee investigations must generally be both reasonable at the
inception and reasonable in scope,5 which is the usual framework for
cases that fall outside the criminal investigation context.6
Applying Fourth Amendment law as it pertains to employers, this
Article considers both GPS tracking for purposes of investigating
individual employee misconduct via a surreptitiously installed tracking
device, and GPS tracking of an entire segment of employees via GPS
devices that have been preinstalled in employer-owned vehicles.
Regarding individual misconduct investigations, this Article proposes
that an employer may track an employee through a GPS device installed
on the employee’s personal or employer-owned vehicle only in very
narrow circumstances. In particular, this Article proposes that this
procedure be used only when the employer has reason to believe such
tracking would corroborate evidence that an employee has committed a
terminable offense, and only after alternative methods of investigation
fail to generate enough evidence of wrongdoing to warrant disciplinary
action. This Article further proposes that in these narrow circumstances,
an employer should avoid collecting data as to purely private activity,
unconnected to work obligations or alleged workplace misconduct, and
may only track an employee’s vehicle long enough to obtain the
information it needs to corroborate a suspicion of wrongdoing. If GPS
tracking continues beyond this point, the employer risks having any
disciplinary action it takes against the employee overturned in court and
may also risk civil liability for unduly invading the employee’s privacy.
Employing a corroboration framework similar to that of Illinois v. Gates7
and Alabama v. White,8 this Article thus presents a clear set of guidelines
for investigating workplace misconduct by GPS, one that will allow
employers to use this investigative technique in a reasonable manner
while simultaneously respecting the rights of employees to be free from
overly intrusive investigations into their private affairs.
Next, this Article considers GPS tracking for noninvestigatory workrelated purposes.9 Drawing upon a recent New York case,10 this Article
5. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26.
6. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). See generally United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (summarizing “special needs” cases, including
those where the doctrine was deemed not to apply).
7. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
8. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
9. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723 (adopting a framework for analyzing searches performed
for “either a noninvestigatory work-related” purpose or to investigate “suspected work-related
employee misfeasance”).
10. Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2013), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
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proposes that wholesale GPS tracking of an entire segment of employees,
such as a group of taxi-cab or Uber drivers, should be performed only for
legitimate business purposes and only if employees consent to such
monitoring in advance. This Article further proposes that to remain
reasonable in scope, employers should avoid collecting GPS data while
its employees are off duty.11
Finally, this Article addresses location tracking by employers through
smartphone apps, including apps designed for employee timekeeping
purposes. Because employees who use such apps typically consent to the
monitoring of their phone’s location and voluntarily convey evidence of
their location to their employers, this Article concludes that this form of
location tracking is simply not a Fourth Amendment “search,” either
under the physical trespass test or under the Katz test, such that it is
generally not an invasion of privacy. As a result, this Article predicts that
employer use of such apps will grow exponentially in the coming years
given the more relaxed privacy laws—flowing from the Fourth
Amendment concepts of consent and assumption of risk—that govern
this form of location tracking.12
Part I of this Article summarizes the general privacy rights of both
public and private employees. Part II examines the law governing GPS
tracking by law enforcement and how it impacts the emerging law of GPS
tracking by employers, an issue addressed in Part III. Finally, Part IV
examines the tracking of an employee’s movements via GPS-enabled
smartphone.
I. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
American workers, whether employed by public or private employers,
are entitled to privacy protections in the workplace.13 Along with the
protections afforded by various statutes, employees may be protected

11. See infra notes 292–318 and accompanying text.
12. See generally Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 477 (N.Y.
2013) (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (“Given the majority’s imprimatur of warrantless GPS
tracking, less intrusive methods for investigating government employees will almost certainly be
replaced with electronic surveillance.”); David K. Isom, Location Based Electronic Discovery in
Criminal and Civil Litigation - Part 1, UTAH B.J. 28, 32 (2011) (“With hundreds of thousands of
apps now available, and thousands of geo-apps, and more on the way, apps-engendered location
metadata will continue to increase in volume and importance.”); Scott McCartney, A New Level
of Security on Your Business Trip, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2018, 9:11 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/a-new-level-of-security-on-your-business-trip-1527685866 [https://perma.cc/C9RHD23L] (reporting that U.S. companies are tracking employees through their smartphones much
more frequently than in the past).
13. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (establishing that employees of public employers enjoy
Fourth Amendment protections in the workplace).
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from employer intrusions by constitutional provisions and tort law.14
Because the rules governing public and private employers differ in some
respects, one must first determine the type of employer at issue in a given
case to properly analyze a workplace privacy claim. This section
summarizes the usual privacy claims brought against both types of
employers.
A. Employees of Public Employers
When an employee of a public employer believes her privacy rights
have been violated, she will generally sue her employer under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging a violation of her constitutional right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.15
Although the Fourth Amendment is often applied to law enforcement
in the context of criminal investigations, the Supreme Court has applied
the Fourth Amendment to other types of government officials, including
public school officials,16 building inspectors,17 and health and safety
inspectors.18 However, because such actors are usually not engaged in
criminal investigations, their actions are judged according to a general
“reasonableness” standard; the criminal law standard, by contrast,
involves a more specific reasonableness analysis of whether the police
should have obtained a warrant or acted pursuant to some warrant
exception.19 Searches and investigations by public employers are
likewise subject to the general reasonableness approach, such that a
public employer’s workspace intrusion is judged by the reasonableness
of the employer’s actions under the circumstances of each case.20
To fully comprehend the law with respect to employee tracking, it is
necessary to understand the broader contours of Fourth Amendment
analysis. Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by government officials. 21 At its

14. See infra notes 101–08 (discussing various privacy-related torts and statutes).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 714 (noting that the plaintiff
in the case, Dr. Ortega, brought suit against his employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “alleging that
the search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment”); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).
16. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).
17. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 540 (1967).
18. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13, 324 (1978).
19. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
20. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977)
(“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in
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most basic level, there are three steps to Fourth Amendment analysis. In
the first step, courts consider the threshold question of whether a
“search”22 or “seizure”23 has occurred, without which the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.24 To determine whether a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred, courts generally employ the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test derived from Katz v. United
States.25 Under the Katz test, a search occurs only when the government
violates a person’s expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
legitimate or reasonable.26 Under this test, the reasonableness of any
asserted expectation of privacy is context-specific,27 and will depend on
various factors, such as the intrusiveness of an investigative technique,28
all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).
22. The term “search” is a legal term of art distinct from its ordinary dictionary definition.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (contrasting the Fourth Amendment
definition of “search” with the dictionary definition of “search”). Indeed, many routine forms of
police surveillance are not considered Fourth Amendment “searches,” such as a dog sniff at an
airport, even where the obvious purpose of the activity is to uncover evidence of a crime. See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
23. Fourth Amendment claims may involve seizures of persons and seizures of property.
Under Fourth Amendment precedent, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.” United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Seizures of persons include both investigative detentions
of limited scope and duration, which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity as well as arrests, which are more intrusive than investigative detentions and therefore
require the existence of probable cause to be reasonable. United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465,
1467–68 (10th Cir. 1996).
24. See 19 WILLIAM A. KNOX, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4:1 (3d ed. 2017) (“If no ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ takes place, then the Fourth
Amendment inquiry may be terminated because when there is no search or seizure, there is no
need to obtain a warrant or even to consider whether the search or seizure was ‘reasonable.’”).
25. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 360–61 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.”’); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33 (discussing this
framework); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (speaking in terms of a
“legitimate expectation of privacy,” or “one that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable”).
27. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is understood to differ
according to context.”). Compare Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding,
based on the particular facts of the case, that employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of his office computer), with United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248–49 (10th
Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a
personal computer he “voluntarily transferred . . . to a public place for work-related use”).
28. A custodial arrest, for example, requires a greater degree of suspicion to be reasonable
than does a suspect’s brief, noncustodial detention. Compare New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14,
18 (1990) (noting the “long . . . settled” rule that “a warrantless arrest in a public place [is]
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the suspect’s status,29 the location of the search,30 and the precise manner
of investigation—including whether sophisticated technology was
employed.31 In the employment context, expectations of privacy also
largely depend on whether an employee has been notified of, and has
consented to, the monitoring at issue.32 Courts also consider the
permissible as long as the arresting officer had probable cause”), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20–22 (1968) (authorizing a brief, temporary seizure of a person suspected of committing a crime
on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause). Likewise, a strip search requires
a greater degree of suspicion than a search of a person’s backpack or outer clothing. See Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 373–77 (2009) (permitting search of a teenage
girl’s backpack and outer clothing but striking down a search of her underwear and bra which was
a “quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks”).
29. For example, K–12 students and arrestees enjoy less Fourth Amendment protection than
ordinary adult citizens. As one specific example, adult citizens enjoy full Fourth Amendment
protection in their closed containers, which require either a warrant or an applicable warrant
exception to search. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1977), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). In the K–12 context, however, warrantless searches
of lockers, purses, backpacks, cars, and clothing have all been upheld as reasonable based on a
mere “reasonable suspicion” that the student violated either the law or school rules. See Bernard
James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101
IOWA L. REV. 343, 350–51 (2015).
30. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that dog sniffs do not constitute Fourth
Amendment “searches,” given that the asserted expectation of privacy is unreasonable when the
dog sniff occurs in the airport (involving a passenger’s luggage), or on a public road (where a dog
is employed to sniff around a car). Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). On the other hand, the Court ruled in 2013 that police
deployment of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a home was a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).
31. For example, a suspect’s location may typically be determined, without judicial
approval, via cell tower records, but may not be obtained without a warrant through a GPS device
that police attach to the same suspect’s vehicle. See Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone
Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 221–29 (2013)
(comparing cases); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–36 (striking down warrantless police use of a
thermal imaging device to scan the outside of a suspect’s home, and recognizing that searches
conducted via sophisticated technologies are fundamentally distinct from those that are not);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I do not regard as
dispositive the fact that the government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful
conventional surveillance techniques.”).
32. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Government
employees may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their offices . . . . However, office
practices, procedures, or regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations.”); id. (on the
merits, finding that search of employee’s computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
because company’s Internet policy allowed it to “‘audit, inspect, and/or monitor’ employees’ use
of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages,” such that
the employee could not reasonably expect privacy in files downloaded from the Internet); see also
United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding computer
search over Fourth Amendment challenge in part because employee gave written consent to
inspection when he began his employment); United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654
(E.D. Va. 2011) (finding public school employee could not reasonably expect privacy in e-mails
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ownership of the property subject to intrusion, as employees generally
enjoy fewer expectations of privacy in property owned by their
employers, particularly where an employer policy authorizes searches
and inspections of the property.33
In deciding whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, courts
alternatively apply the physical trespass-based test,34 which became more
prominent in search analysis as a result of the United States Supreme
Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones.35 Under this test, courts
consider whether the government “obtain[ed] information by physically
intruding” on a person, house, paper, or effect,36 in which case a Fourth
Amendment search occurred, regardless of whether it would be
reasonable to expect privacy in the case.37 In Jones, the Court held that a
Fourth Amendment search occurred when police obtained location
information by trespassorily attaching a GPS tracking device to a criminal
suspect’s vehicle, an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment, and using
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements.38 As a result, the Jones

with his wife that were stored on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his
computer were subject to inspection, which he acknowledged); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he presence or absence of opportunities to consent
voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the
participant.”).
33. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398; Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 654; cf. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014) (examining the substantial privacy rights in modern
cell phones, and declaring that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house” because a phone contains not only “many
sensitive records previously found in the home,” but also “a broad array of private information
never found in a home in any form”).
34. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“There are two ways in which the government’s conduct may constitute a ‘search’ implicating
the Fourth Amendment.”).
35. 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012); see also United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 (8th
Cir. 2012) (“An individual may challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the
individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion
of a constitutionally protected area.”’ (citations omitted) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 414)); United
States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (W.D. La. 2012) (“Jones established, or perhaps
reiterated, that there are two ways to analyze [whether a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has
occurred]: a traditional common-law property rights test and the Katz/reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test.”).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing, in pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures”).
37. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 n.3).
38. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device
on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a
‘search.’” (footnote omitted)).
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majority did not consider whether a search would have occurred under
the alternative reasonable expectation of privacy test.39
Once a court determines that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure
has occurred in a given case, the court must then determine whether the
government’s conduct was “reasonable.”40 In the context of criminal
investigations, a warrant or some warrant exception is generally required
for a search or seizure to be reasonable.41 In addition searches or seizures
ordinarily require a finding of probable cause, whether before the search,
in the case of warrants, or afterwards, in the case of many of the numerous
search warrant exceptions.42
Outside the criminal context, courts determine whether a particular
search was reasonable by balancing the government’s interests against
the plaintiff’s interests to arrive at a framework for assessing
reasonableness, then applying that framework to the case at hand. 43 As
39. See id. at 406.
40. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1967) (turning to “[t]he question
remaining for decision [of] whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with
constitutional standards” after finding that a “search” had occurred in the case); cf. Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (“The installation and use of a pen register . . . was not a
‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”).
41. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“‘Over and again this Court has emphasized
that’ . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir.
2004) (recognizing that in the criminal context, either a warrant or an applicant warrant exception
may satisfy the Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment
is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1994) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to control executive power and that it does so via a strong preference for searches
and seizures conducted pursuant to warrants); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (explaining
why a specific type of police conduct, the Terry “stop and frisk,” is not subject to the ordinary
requirements of a warrant and probable cause).
42. Many warrant exceptions require probable cause. Under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, for example, police may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and the vehicle is “readily
mobile.” See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). Also, under the search incident
to arrest exception, police must have probable cause to arrest a suspect before they may search
the arrestee as an incident to the arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification. . . . [Thus,] in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’
search under that Amendment.”). The plain view exception to the warrant requirement likewise
requires a showing of probable cause. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that
probable cause is required to seize an item under the plain view exception).
43. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–41 (1985) (explaining, in one special
needs scenario, why the warrant and probable cause requirements are particularly unsuited to the
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this law has developed, the Supreme Court has often held that such
“special needs” searches must be both reasonable at their inception and
reasonable in scope,44 but the Court has generally refused to require either
warrants or probable cause, opting instead for a less rigorous level of
suspicion.45
Finally, once a court determines that a search or seizure has occurred
(under step 1), and if such action was deemed unreasonable (under step
2), the court must determine the remedy for the Fourth Amendment
violation.46 In the criminal prosecution context, the usual remedy is
exclusion of any evidence obtained as a result of the violation,47 without
which a criminal prosecution will often fail.48 The exclusionary rule also
applies in certain employee disciplinary proceedings.49 Nevertheless, in
the employment context—such as in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit alleging
a Fourth Amendment violation—the usual remedy is money damages for
the employee whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated.50
O’Connor v. Ortega,51 which involved an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation by a public employer, illustrates the first and second steps
K–12 school environment and adopting a general reasonableness standard for assessing the
legality of a student search).
44. See, e.g., id. at 341–42 (applying this framework to K–12 school searches).
45. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720–22 (1987) (rejecting the warrant and
probable cause requirements in the employment context). In one special needs scenario, the Court
found that “[t]he warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the [K–12] school environment [because]
requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. For similar
reasons, the T.L.O. Court found the probable cause requirement inapplicable as well. See id. at
341.
46. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590–91 (2006) (recognizing that
although evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is often excluded in a
subsequent criminal prosecution, exclusion is not always required).
47. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (establishing the general rule that “all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in
a state court”). There are, however, numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule in the criminal
context. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (refusing to
exclude evidence obtained from an illegal instance of GPS tracking under the attenuation
exception to the exclusionary rule).
48. Whether a criminal conviction may be obtained, despite the exclusion of a key piece of
evidence, will of course depend on whether the prosecution has additional, legally-obtained
evidence sufficient to support a conviction.
49. See Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011), rev’d, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013) (involving application of the exclusionary rule in an
employee disciplinary proceeding, rather than in an invasion of privacy suit against the employer).
50. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (noting that a plaintiff-employee was awarded $108,000 in damages for an invasion of
privacy by her employer).
51. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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outlined above, and is particularly significant in assessing the privacy
rights of employees. 52
O’Connor involved a search of the office of a state hospital employee,
Dr. Magno Ortega. The search uncovered personal items later used in an
administrative proceeding resulting in the employee’s termination.53
Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court first
clarified that a search or seizure of a government employee’s property
may be subject to Fourth Amendment restraints, thereby rejecting the
employer’s argument that public employees may never reasonably expect
privacy at work.54 Noting that Fourth Amendment protections are
contextual,55 the Court then declared that different workplaces generate
different expectations of privacy depending on their unique “operational
realities.”56 According to the Court, factors that may influence actual
expectations of privacy in a particular workplace include “actual office
practices and procedures,”57 “the context of the employment relation,”58
and “legitimate regulation” of the workspace.59 The Court noted, for
example, that some government offices may be so open to others that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable.60 In the employment context, other
factors—including, most notably, notice and consent to the employer
practice at issue61—have become critical as well.
Turning to the particular circumstances of Dr. Ortega’s workplace, the
Court determined that Dr. Ortega could indeed reasonably expect privacy
in his office.62 The Court emphasized that Dr. Ortega did not share his
desk or file cabinets with other employees, that he had occupied his office
for 17 years and had kept personal materials there, and that his
expectation of privacy was not diminished by any hospital policy
discouraging employees from storing personal items in desks or file
cabinets.63 As such, Dr. Ortega reasonably expected privacy “at least in
his desk and file cabinets.”64
Having determined that Dr. Ortega was indeed entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection, the Court then sought to determine “the standard
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 715 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 712–13.
Id. at 715, 717.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 719.
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of reasonableness applicable to [this] particular class of [workplace]
searches.”65 As a special needs scenario involving a non-criminal
investigation, the applicable reasonableness standard would be
determined by balancing the nature of the intrusion into the employee’s
private affairs against the employer interests at stake, including “the
government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of
the workplace.”66
After weighing the competing interests, the Court determined that the
warrant requirement should not apply in this scenario, as public
employers “are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of
criminal laws” and instead conduct “work-related searches [as a mere]
incident to the primary business of the [employer].”67 For similar reasons,
the Court determined that probable cause should not be required. 68 As a
result, the Court concluded that “public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
[1] noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for [2]
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”69
Regarding the noninvestigatory form of intrusion, the Court noted that
the reasonableness inquiry would not be particularly rigorous, and that
public employers should be afforded “wide latitude” to perform such
intrusions70 given that the employer’s interest in efficient operation of the
workplace is “substantial” vis-à-vis the relatively limited expectations of
privacy enjoyed by employees, which “are far less than those found at
home or in some other contexts.”71 The Court “[came] to a similar
conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of workrelated employee misconduct,”72 and further emphasized that a
“reasonable suspicion” standard, as opposed to probable cause, would
best serve the needs of such employers “in [promptly] correcting the
employee misconduct.”73
Finally, the Court declared that a public employer search—regardless
of whether it is conducted for an investigatory or noninvestigatory
65. Id.
66. Id. at 719–20.
67. Id. at 722.
68. See id. at 722–25. The Court emphasized that its decision was limited to public
employer searches that involve either a noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an
investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee malfeasance. See id. at
725–26.
69. Id. at 725–26.
70. Id. at 723.
71. Id. at 725.
72. Id. at 724.
73. Id.
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purpose—will be deemed “reasonable” only if reasonable at its inception
and in its scope.74 As to the first prong, the Court declared that a search
of an employee’s office will be “‘justified at its inception’ when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search
is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to
retrieve a needed file” from an employee’s office.75 Finally, the Court
added that such a search will be reasonable in scope when “the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”76
O’Connor provides four significant takeaways for the question of
whether employee tracking is lawful. First, O’Connor established that
government employees may enjoy Fourth Amendment protections in a
given workplace, depending on its unique circumstances.77 Second,
O’Connor ruled that the Fourth Amendment claim of a public employee
will depend on whether the employer acted reasonably, both at inception
and in scope.78 Third, for a search to be reasonable at its inception, the
employer conducting the search must have had “reasonable suspicion”79
either that the search would turn up evidence of work-related misconduct,
or that the search was necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose, such as to retrieve a needed file from an employee’s office.80
Finally, to be reasonable in scope, the employer’s search must not be
“excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”81
74. Id. at 725–26.
75. Id. at 726.
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
77. Id. at 725–26.
78. Id. at 726.
79. See id. at 724 (“The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need
for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often
irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.” (emphasis
added)). Although at times the O’Connor Court used the phrase, “reasonable grounds for
suspecting,” this phrase has been repeatedly used by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment
cases as a substitute for the familiar “reasonable suspicion” standard. See United States v. Vinton,
594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, in the context of the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement, the Court’s use of the phrase “reasonable to believe” in
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), “probably is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard”).
Moreover, courts have interpreted the O’Connor language itself as requiring a showing of
“reasonable suspicion.” See Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y.
2013) (“Under O’Connor, a workplace search based on a reasonable suspicion of employee
misconduct is ‘justified at its inception.’” (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality
opinion))).
80. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 726 (alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
(1985)).
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Over twenty years after O’Connor, the Supreme Court applied the
O’Connor framework in another public employer search case, City of
Ontario v. Quon,82 involving the city’s review of text messages sent and
received on Ontario police officer Jeff Quon’s employer-issued pager.83
Before acquiring the pagers, the city informed its officers that it had a
right to review text messages sent and received using the pagers.84 After
Officer Quon and others had reimbursed the city multiple times for
exceeding their monthly allowance of text messages, the city wished to
determine whether the monthly text message character limit should be
increased, requiring the city to determine whether officers like Quon were
incurring overage fees for work-related or personal messages.85 To that
end, Quon’s supervisors obtained two months of pager transcripts from
provider Arch Wireless.86 After redacting all messages Quon sent while
off duty, officials learned that most of Quon’s text messages sent during
work hours were not work-related.87 As a result, Quon was disciplined
for pursuing personal matters while on duty.88 Quon then sued the city,
alleging that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights by reviewing his
pager messages.89 After the lower courts issued differing rulings on the
issue, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
Fourth Amendment claim.90
During the Supreme Court proceedings, the parties agreed that the
O’Connor framework would control.91 Applying that framework, the
Court assumed that Quon reasonably expected privacy in the contents of
his text messages92 and went on to address the overall reasonableness of
the search by considering whether it was justified at its inception and
reasonable in scope.93
Finding the search reasonable under both prongs, the Court first
declared that the text message review was “justified at its inception
because there were ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
[was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose,’”94 namely,
82. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
83. Id. at 752.
84. Id. at 751–52.
85. Id. at 752.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 752–53.
88. Id. at 753. The Court says that “Quon was allegedly disciplined.” Id.
89. Id. at 754. There were other plaintiffs and defendants in the case. See id. at 753. For
simplicity, this Article limits its discussion to Quon’s suit against the City.
90. See id. at 754–55 (describing the lower court rulings).
91. Id. at 757.
92. Id. at 760.
93. Id. at 760–61.
94. Id. at 761.
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to ensure the city was paying only for work-related, rather than personal,
communications.95
As for the search’s scope, the Court emphasized the limited scope of
the city’s review, noting that although Quon had exceeded his monthly
character limit several times, the city reviewed only two months of
transcripts and redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty, which
reduced the review’s intrusiveness.96 Finally, the Court noted that Quon
had been informed his text messages could be reviewed and thus had
“received no assurances of privacy,” thereby “lessen[ing] the risk that the
[city’s] review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life.”97
For these reasons, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation.98
B. Employees of Private Employers
Given the lack of state action, private employers are typically not
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.99 Nevertheless, private
employers may face liability for alleged privacy invasions through tort
law, including the torts of intrusion upon seclusion (intrusion),100 public

95. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
96. Id. at 761–62.
97. Id. at 762–63.
98. Id. at 763–65.
99. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”). Purely private
action cannot form the basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit based on an alleged Fourth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., English v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 14-CV-0284-CVE-FHM, 2015
WL 4623942, at *4–5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
when campus security officers of the University of Tulsa, a private university, entered plaintiff’s
apartment without consent because the alleged Fourth Amendment violation by campus police
was not committed by a person “acting under color of state law” (quoting West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988))). However, in limited instances, a private employer could be subject to
constitutional constraints, particularly where the private party acts as an instrument or agent of
the Government. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614. Whether a private individual or entity should be
deemed an agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes is determined by the totality
of the circumstances. Id. Under this test, most courts consider two primary factors: (1) whether
the government directed, or acquiesced in, the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party
performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends. Under
this test, the greater the government involvement in the search, the less important the private
searcher’s intent. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (striking down
a college dorm room search conducted by both local law enforcement officers and university
officials, at the request and direction of the local police, and recognizing that a university
regulation permitting administrative inspections of dorm rooms “cannot be construed or applied
so as to give consent to a search for evidence for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution”).
100. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 180–81 (Iowa 2011) (describing the four
invasion of privacy torts).
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disclosure of truthful but private facts about an individual,101 placing a
person in a “false light” by unreasonable and highly objectionable
publicity,102 and appropriating the name or likeness of another for one’s
own commercial use or benefit.103 These distinct forms of invasion each
involve an interference with a person’s “right to be left alone.”104 For
workplace intrusions, private employers might also be governed by
privacy statutes, including the federal Electronic Communications
Privacy Act105 and the Stored Communications Act,106 either of which
might restrain employers from intercepting or reviewing employee email, telephone calls, and other electronic communications.107 In
addition, some state statutes specifically make it unlawful for employers
to utilize GPS tracking as a means of investigating their employees, often
with an exception based on employee consent.108

101. This tort involves publication of information that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and not of legitimate public interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). In one case, for example, a plaintiff employee sued her former employer
under this tort when the former employer posted an interoffice memo about the plaintiff’s
termination on a bulletin board visible to numerous employees. Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183
Cal. Rptr. 17, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
102. “To prevail on a claim of ‘false light,’ a plaintiff ‘must show that a highly offensive
false statement was publicized by [defendants] with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the
falsity.’” Taha v. Bucks Cty., 9 F. Supp. 3d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Santillo v. Reedel,
634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)), aff’d, 862 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2017); see, e.g., id. at 491,
494 (finding sufficient “false light” claim against company based on plaintiff’s allegations that
company selectively published his expunged arrest record and mugshot on its website in order to
falsely portray him as a criminal, thereby creating a false impression regarding his criminal history
and character).
103. Under this cause of action, liability arises from the use of the name or likeness of a
public figure absent consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b.
104. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 181 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b).
105. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2511 (2012)).
106. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2712 (2012)).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (prohibiting the intentional interception of any electronic
communication); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548,
557–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (interpreting the ECPA, consistently with most courts’ interpretation, to
apply only to the simultaneous “interception” of e-mail as it is being sent and received; for e-mails
that are in storage, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012) would
apply).
108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2018) (requiring an employer to provide
prior written notice to all employees informing them that they may be monitored electronically,
as a general rule); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-2.5(b) (2018) (generally prohibiting persons in
Illinois from using an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a
person, with an exception for consent, among others); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d
328, 333–34 (Conn. 2010) (suggesting the Connecticut statute would apply to GPS tracking).
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The tort of intrusion is the most common tort used to sue employers
for privacy invasions in the workplace, and its requirements overlap with
those of the Fourth Amendment. To prevail on an intrusion claim, a
plaintiff must prove that “(1) her solitude, seclusion, or private affairs
were intentionally infringed upon, and that (2) this infringement would
highly offend a reasonable person.”109
Courts considering intrusion claims usually also consider whether the
plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in the case at hand, because
without such an expectation an intrusion claim would fail.110 A recent
District Court opinion denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss involving
Facebook posts, Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp.,111
exemplifies this reasonable expectation of privacy approach.
According to the plaintiff’s allegations in Ehling, plaintiff Deborah
Ehling was a registered nurse and paramedic who worked for MonmouthOcean Hospital Service Corporation (MONOC), a nonprofit hospital
service corporation in New Jersey.112 In July 2008, Ehling became the
acting president of a local union for professional emergency medical
services personnel, and in that capacity she sought to protect the rights of
union members by filing various complaints against MONOC.113
According to Ehling, her union activities caused MONOC to retaliate
against her, eventually leading to her termination in July 2011.114

109. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 2012)
(citing Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency Inc., 452 A.2d 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982))
(applying New Jersey law); see also K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
682 (Tex. 1975)) (“[I]n Texas, an actionable invasion of privacy by intrusion must consist of an
unjustified intrusion of the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion of such magnitude as to cause an
ordinary individual to feel severely offended, humiliated, or outraged.”).
110. There appear to be two bases for considering whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists, even though it is not usually thought of as a formal element of the tort of intrusion.
According to some courts, the first element of the tort “requires an intentional intrusion into a
matter the plaintiff has a right to expect privacy,” making it necessary to consider the threshold
question of reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 181
(Iowa 2011). According to other courts, an infringement upon one’s privacy cannot be highly
offensive if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place. See, e.g., Acosta v.
Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649–52 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (analyzing a plaintiff–employee’s
intrusion upon seclusion claim by considering whether the employee could reasonably expect
privacy in videotaping occurring at work and, upon finding he could not, stating that it need not
address whether the alleged privacy intrusion was “highly offensive” to prove the tort of
intrusion).
111. 872 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.N.J. 2012).
112. Id. at 370.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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From 2008 to 2009, Ehling maintained a private Facebook account
with limited access to Ehling’s “friends.”115 Ehling invited many
coworkers, but no members of MONOC management, to be her Facebook
friends.116 In June 2009, MONOC officials gained access to Ehling’s
Facebook account when a supervisor summoned a MONOC employee,
who was one of Ehling’s Facebook friends, into an office and coerced
him into accessing his Facebook account on a work computer in the
supervisor’s presence.117 The supervisor then viewed and copied Ehling’s
Facebook postings, including one unusual comment Ehling had made
regarding a shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.,
wherein Ehling blamed the D.C. paramedics for the death of a museum
guard.118
A few days later, MONOC officials informed the New Jersey Board
of Nursing and the New Jersey Department of Health of Ehling’s
Facebook post, expressing its concern that Ehling’s post “showed a
disregard for patient safety.”119 According to Ehling, MONOC’s letters
placed her nursing license at risk and were intended to damage her
reputation and employment opportunities.120 As a result, Ehling sued
MONOC and others for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (common law
invasion of privacy) due to the supervisor’s unauthorized “accessing of
her private Facebook postings.”121 Defendants then moved to dismiss the
claim, arguing that Ehling could not reasonably expect privacy in her
Facebook post because it was disclosed to potentially hundreds of
people.122 In response, Ehling argued that she could reasonably expect
privacy in her post, at least insofar as the supervisor who accessed her
page was concerned, because her comment was disclosed to a limited
number of people whom she had personally invited to view a restricted
access webpage.123
Denying Defendants’ motion, the court noted that Ehling’s case
occupied a middle ground between cases finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy for “material posted to an unprotected website that
anyone can view,” and those finding “a reasonable expectation of privacy
for individual, password-protected online communications.”124 Because
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 370–71.
120. Id. at 371.
121. Id. at 372.
122. Id. at 372, 374.
123. Id. at 374.
124. Id. at 373–74 (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d
205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004); Stengart v. Loving
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the matter was unclear, the court decided that Ehling’s intrusion claim
should not be dismissed, explaining that “reasonableness (and
offensiveness) are highly fact-sensitive inquiries” that are “not properly
resolved on a motion to dismiss.”125
Although Ehling’s case involved a suit against a private employer for
the tort of intrusion, the court’s entire analysis of Ehling’s tortious
intrusion claim at the motion to dismiss stage focused on whether Ehling
could reasonably expect privacy in her Facebook post.126 Numerous other
cases involving private employers follow the same approach and
emphasize that the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis under the
tort of intrusion involves both a subjective and objective component, just
as it does under the Fourth Amendment.127
Although the formal proof requirements of a Fourth Amendment
claim (typically brought against a public employer) and an invasion of
privacy tort claim (typically brought against a private employer) are
distinct, a plaintiff suing either type of employer under either type of
claim must ordinarily prove she could reasonably expect privacy in the
case at hand.128 Nevertheless, because the tort of intrusion requires proof
that the defendant’s invasion of a plaintiff’s privacy would cause an
individual “to feel severely offended, humiliated, or outraged,”129 this tort
is arguably more difficult to prove than a Fourth Amendment claim,
which merely requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s conduct was
“unreasonable.”130 Thus, it makes sense to first examine instances of
employee tracking through an expectation of privacy lens, and then to
consider whether reasonableness (under the Fourth Amendment) or
extreme offensiveness (under the tort of intrusion) might change the
outcome in a given case. Before addressing the most common methods
of employee tracking, this Article examines the law that governs GPS
Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010)).
125. Id. at 374.
126. See id.
127. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660–61 (comparing the two claims); see also, e.g., Acosta v.
Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649–52 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (analyzing plaintiff-employee’s
intrusion upon seclusion claim by examining whether his asserted expectation of privacy at work
was reasonable); Stengart, 990 A.2d at 663–64 (analyzing plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion
claim against a private employer by considering whether plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy
in e-mails she retrieved on her work computer, examining both plaintiff’s subjective expectation
of privacy and whether her expectation was objectively reasonable).
128. Cf. Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660 (“[T]he reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard used
by the parties [in a suit against a private employer] derives from the common law and the Search
and Seizure Clauses of both the Fourth Amendment and . . . the New Jersey Constitution. The
[constitutional] sources do not apply in this case, which involves conduct by private parties
only.”).
129. K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App. 1984).
130. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 3

1284

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

tracking by law enforcement, which necessarily impacts the related issue
of GPS tracking by employers.
II. GPS TRACKING BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Although there are few reported cases involving GPS tracking by
employers, those cases must be viewed in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones,131 which involved
GPS tracking by law enforcement.132
A. The Law of Electronic Tracking Before United States v. Jones
Before Jones was decided in 2012, law enforcement routinely utilized
GPS tracking devices, without having obtained a warrant authorizing
them to do so, to monitor the movements of criminal suspects.133 When
criminal defendants challenged this form of investigation, most courts
rejected those challenges by invoking the principle that no person can
reasonably expect privacy in his or her movements in public.134 This
131. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
132. Id. at 403.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 272–73 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated,
565 U.S. 1189 (2012) (describing an investigation in which Arizona police attached a GPS
tracking device to the suspect’s Jeep and then tracked the Jeep’s movements into several states);
United States v. Smith, 387 F. App’x. 918, 919 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing an
investigation in Florida in which police installed a GPS device on the truck of a person suspected
of trafficking marijuana); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2010) (recounting
how DEA and Iowa state police placed a GPS tracking device on a vehicle’s bumper while it was
parked in Iowa and used the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements to Colorado); United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Over a four-month period, [DEA]
agents [in Oregon] repeatedly monitored Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep using various types of mobile
tracking devices.”), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2010); United States v. Santiago, 560 F.3d 62, 64–
65 (1st Cir. 2009) (detailing “a year-long investigation into a large-scale heroin distribution
operation” in 2003 and 2004 in Massachusetts, in which agents tracked defendant’s van with a
GPS unit); United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that in a robbery
investigation, police in Michigan “secretly placed a GPS tracking device on the [defendant’s]
rental car” while it was parked at an apartment complex); United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267,
281 (4th Cir. 2007) (detailing an extensive federal drug investigation in Maryland involving GPS
trackers).
134. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (“[W]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a
particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked
in a public place, they install a noninvasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of
time.”); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216–17 (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking
of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United States
v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking
is not a search); see also Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 276 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of
using [GPS tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the
[Supreme] Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in that which they reveal to third parties or leave open to view by others.”).
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result is seemingly supported by two Supreme Court cases from the
1980s, each involving the tracking of a vehicle by electronic beeper.
In United States v. Knotts,135 the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
use of a beeper to track a drum of chloroform along a 100-mile journey.136
According to the Court in Knotts, the use of the beeper did not constitute
a Fourth Amendment search because the beeper did not provide any
information police could not have obtained through simple visual
surveillance.137 Just one year later, the Court in United States v. Karo138
reached the opposite result in a similar case, primarily because the beeper
in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a private residence.139
Distinguishing Knotts, the Court reasoned that “[i]ndiscriminate
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view” must
remain subject to Fourth Amendment oversight.140
Invoking Knotts, pre-Jones GPS tracking cases typically found that
when a GPS tracking device is used to monitor a suspect’s movements
on public roads, no Fourth Amendment search occurs—because a suspect
cannot reasonably expect privacy in those movements given that police
could have simply trailed the suspicious vehicle to obtain the same
information.141 However, some pre-Jones courts refused to apply this
rationale on the grounds that it fails to account for differences between
trailing a vehicle for a few hours and using GPS technology to track that
same vehicle for a substantially longer period of time, which is far more

135. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
136. Id. at 276. Having suspected Knotts of manufacturing drugs, federal officers, without a
warrant, had installed a beeper in a chemical drum they knew would be sold to Knotts. Id. at 278.
With the beeper’s assistance, officers followed Knotts’s vehicle to where it stopped outside a
certain cabin. Id. Based on this information, the police secured a warrant to search the cabin and
uncovered incriminating evidence inside. Id. at 279.
137. According to the Knotts Court, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,” and the “use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the vehicle] . . . does not alter the
situation.” Id. at 281–82.
138. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
139. See id. at 714.
140. Id. at 716. As the Court explained, “[Karo] is thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper
told the authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin. . . . [H]ere, [by contrast] . . . the
monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually
verified [by the police from outside the house].” Id. at 715.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010)
(invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle
over a prolonged period is not a search), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012); United States v. Garcia,
474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (same), abrogated by 776 F.3d 513 (2015).
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invasive.142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones to resolve the
split.143
B. United States v. Jones
In Jones, all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court struck down
one instance of GPS tracking in which a suspect’s vehicle was monitored on
public streets for nearly a month.144
In Jones, officers surreptitiously installed a GPS tracking device on
suspect Antoine Jones’s Jeep, without a valid warrant,145 and used the
device to track the vehicle for twenty-eight days.146 The resulting GPS
data connected Jones to a structure that contained cash and cocaine,
leading to criminal charges against him.147 Before trial, Jones moved to
suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS tracking device, but the
trial court denied the motion by invoking the Knotts rationale that no
person may reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public.148

142. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting
the Government’s argument, based on an attempted extension of Knotts, that “[a] person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another” even in such extended instances of GPS tracking); People
v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–1201 (N.Y. 2009) (distinguishing Knotts) (“At first blush, it
would appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the
surveillance technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress of a vehicle
over . . . predominantly public roads and, as in Knotts, these movements were at least in theory
exposed to ‘anyone who wanted to look.’ This, however, is where the similarity ends.” (quoting
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)).
143. United States v. Jones, 564 U.S. 1036 (2011).
144. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a
warrant (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf
of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in
that case constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant);
id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (agreeing with the majority that
“a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here,
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’”
(alteration in original)).
145. Although the officers had obtained a warrant authorizing installation of the device, the
device was installed after the warrant had expired and outside the jurisdiction specified in the
warrant. See id. at 402–03 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 403. The device relayed more than 2,000 pages of data regarding the vehicle’s
movements over the four-week period. Id.
147. Id. at 403–04.
148. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Knotts, 460
U.S. at 281–82), rev’d in part, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The
District Court granted the motion in part, suppressing only the data obtained while the vehicle
was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. Id. at 88.
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On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court—consisting of Justices
Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor149—considered
“whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking
device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”150 By phrasing
the issue in this manner, the Jones majority effectively limited its analysis
to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,”151 rather than
within private spaces,152 potentially triggering the Knotts rationale that
no person may reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public.
Refusing to apply this rationale, the majority held that a search had
occurred.153 Since no warrant justified the search, the evidentiary fruits
of that search had to be suppressed.154
While all nine Justices in Jones agreed that this particular instance of GPS
tracking triggered the protections of the Fourth Amendment,155 the Justices

149. Jones, 565 U.S. at 401.
150. Id. at 402.
151. Id.
152. In limiting the issue to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,” the Jones
majority seemingly accepted the District Court’s suppression of the GPS tracking data obtained
while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. See id. at 402–03.
153. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Id.
at 404. In its brief in Jones, the Government argued that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information that is knowingly exposed to public view, and that Antoine
Jones himself had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle on public
streets because that information was exposed to public view. See Brief for the United States at 18,
38, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259). The Government argued that “[t]his case, like Knotts,
involves movements of a vehicle on public streets,” which is unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 19, 22. By ruling for Jones, the majority effectively rejected the Government’s
Knotts-based argument. See also United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL
5145537, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (“The [Jones] majority opinion also impliedly rejects as
unsupported, by Knotts or otherwise, the suggestion that an unconstitutional search is permissible
if it produces only public information.”).
154. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (affirming the lower court’s judgment that admission of the
evidence obtained by use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment and refusing to
address the Government’s argument that the warrantless “search” that occurred in this case was
made reasonable, despite no valid warrant, by the reasonable suspicion or probable cause the
officers had obtained before using the device).
155. See id. at 404 (holding that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a [Fourth
Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant (footnote omitted)); see also
id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth
Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth
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were split in their rationale on the question of whether a Fourth Amendment
search had occurred. Five members of the Court applied the physical trespass
doctrine and the remaining members of the Court—along with Justice
Sotomayor, who endorsed both views—applied the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test.156 Applying the physical trespass test, the
majority declared that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the
[Fourth] Amendment”157 and that in this case, the Government physically
trespassed upon Jones’s vehicle by attaching the device to the vehicle
without consent.158 According to the majority, “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device
to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search,’”159 which is
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a valid warrant.160
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, employed the Katz test instead, framing the issue as
“whether the use of GPS tracking in [this] particular case involved a
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated.”161 Emphasizing the length of surveillance as a critical factor
under Katz, the concurring Justices declared that the majority’s trespassbased analysis “largely disregards what is really important (the use of a
GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking),” emphasizing instead the
officers’ seemingly insignificant act of trespassing upon Jones’s
vehicle.162 In the view of these four Justices,
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’” (alteration in original)).
156. See id. at 405–06, 414, 419. According to the majority, Katz did not repudiate the
understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass
upon the areas it enumerates. See id. at 406–07 (majority opinion). Rather, “the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.” Id. at 409. Thus, as the majority saw it, “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or
fall with the Katz formulation.” Id. at 406. For future cases, however, the majority clarified that
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would
remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 411.
157. Id. at 404.
158. According to the majority, “[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached
on a protected area.” Id. at 410.
159. Id. at 404 (footnote omitted). In a similar passage, the majority declared: “The
Government physically occupied private property [i.e., Jones’s vehicle] for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at
404–05.
160. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable . . . .”).
161. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 424–25; see also id. at 430–31 (emphasizing the length of surveillance as critical
under the Katz test). Again emphasizing the length of surveillance, Justice Alito’s concurrence
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the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy [because]
[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.163
For these reasons, the concurring Justices would have ruled that “the
lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case [i.e., twenty-eight days]
constituted a search” under the Katz test.164
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to express agreement with both
the majority and the concurrence.165 According to Justice Sotomayor, the
majority’s trespass-based analysis was sufficient to resolve the case
because “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property for the purpose of
conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests long
afforded . . . Fourth Amendment protection.”166 Justice Sotomayor went
on to declare, however, that the Fourth Amendment could be violated,
“even in the absence of a trespass,” under the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy framework.167 Applying that framework, Justice Sotomayor
agreed with the other four concurring Justices that “at the very least,
‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges
on expectations of privacy.’”168 Accordingly, at least five Justices in
Jones rejected the notion that a person may never reasonably expect
privacy in his movements in public and endorsed the view that GPS
surveillance becomes more intrusive when conducted over a lengthy
period of time, opinions that will likely impact the developing law of
employer-initiated GPS tracking.169

described the issue as “whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Id. at 419.
163. Id. at 430.
164. Id. at 430, 431. Notably, the concurring Justices did not attempt to determine “with
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search,” id. at 430, but declared
that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.” Id.
165. See id. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 413–14.
167. Id. at 414 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
168. Id. at 415.
169. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *7 (D.
Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (recognizing “the principle that a momentary observation is not a search,”
but noting that “the converse of that principle, that a lengthy sustained surveillance at some point
becomes a search, is precisely the point made by Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment [in
Jones], in which four Justices joined and for which a fifth, Justice Sotomayor, expressed some
support”).
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C. How Jones Impacts Employers
Jones impacts the legality of GPS tracking by employers in a number
of ways. First, in unanimously rejecting the GPS tracking decisions
preceding Jones, in which most courts had refused to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to this investigative technique,170 the Jones ruling
revealed a Court concerned by the potential for mass surveillance
inherent in this form of investigation, with an acute concern for longer
term monitoring of a person’s otherwise private affairs.171 Although
Jones dealt with the tracking of a single suspected drug dealer, 172 the
Court’s concerns regarding mass surveillance centered on the potential to
track ordinary, law-abiding citizens on no suspicion of wrongdoing.
Several Justices voiced this concern during oral argument in Jones. For
example, Chief Justice Roberts inquired: “You think there would also not
be a search [i.e., the Fourth Amendment would not apply] if you put a
GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our movements for a month?
You think you’re entitled to do that under your theory?”173 Expressing a
similar concern, Justice Ginsburg inquired:
[T]he government’s position would mean that any of us
could be monitored whenever we leave our homes. So, the
only thing secure is the home. Is—I mean, that is—that is
the end point of [the Government’s] argument, that an
electronic device, as long as it’s not used inside the house, is
okay.174
This overall sentiment, especially considering that no member of the
Court sided with the Government in Jones, reveals that the current Court
might not look favorably upon any instance of mass surveillance,
particularly where the surveillance involves the GPS monitoring of
numerous individuals in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. This would likely be true in the employment context as well
unless, as outlined below, an employer conducts such surveillance for a
legitimate business reason unique to that employer.175
170. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–10.
171. See id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 402 (majority opinion) (describing the suspect as someone who the police
suspected was “trafficking in narcotics”).
173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2011/10 -1259.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WS8K-TAT7].
174. Id. at 12.
175. Recall that O’Connor v. Ortega requires that any search or seizure by a public employer
be both reasonable at its inception and reasonable in scope. 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
Moreover, to be reasonable at its inception, O’Connor requires an employer to have “reasonable
grounds for suspecting” that the employer’s search will turn up evidence that the employee is
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Second, and relatedly, it is doubtful that the employment context
would alter the Court’s analysis with respect to the threshold question of
whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. As noted, a majority
of Justices in Jones agreed that the placement of a GPS tracking device
on a suspect’s vehicle and use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements constitutes a Fourth Amendment search under the physical
trespass test,176 and for that reason courts reviewing instances of GPS
tracking by employers have had no difficulty finding that a search occurs
upon a similar trespassory invasion of a public employee’s vehicle.177
Accordingly, any instance of GPS tracking carried out by a public
employer by means of trespass would almost certainly constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search” and would thus turn on the reasonableness of that
action under the reasonableness test espoused in O’Connor.
Third, when GPS tracking is accomplished in the absence of a
trespass, Jones clearly indicates that the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test controls,178 and there is no reason to believe this test would
not apply for non-trespassory forms of location tracking in the
employment context, where the Katz test has been applied often.179 Thus,
the question becomes whether, and under what exact circumstances, a
reasonable expectation of privacy would exist in the event an employee’s
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory workrelated purpose. Id. at 726. Although public employers should be afforded “wide latitude” to
conduct such searches for “work-related, noninvestigatory reasons,” id. at 723, the employer must
still be able to point to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the search is necessary in a given case,
even where the search is conducted for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose, see id. at 725–
26, which is the most likely instance in which mass surveillance would be used by an employer.
See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
176. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
177. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 471–72 (N.Y.
2013) (applying the physical trespass test, as espoused in Jones, to find a “search” had occurred
when a public employer attached a GPS device to an employee’s vehicle and later used the device
to monitor the vehicle’s movements).
178. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“But ‘[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.’” (alteration in original)); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Jones majority erred in reviving the trespass test and suggesting that
all “search” questions should be governed exclusively by Katz).
179. See, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715–19 (analyzing whether an employee of a public
hospital could reasonably expect privacy in his office); United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246,
1247 (10th Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether the plaintiff–employee could reasonably expect privacy
in a personal computer he used at work); United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (considering whether an employee could reasonably expect privacy in his work
computer); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 635–36 (Tex. App. 1984)
(analyzing whether a search had occurred under Katz by considering whether the employeeplaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in her workplace locker).
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movements are tracked in the absence of a trespass180—most notably,
where an employee’s location is determined through a GPS-enabled cell
phone181 or smartphone app.182 In Jones, five Justices expressed the view
that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy.”183 Although the concurring
Justices were speaking in terms of criminal “offenses,” the Justices
reached this result because “society’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
period.”184 Although it is unclear who these “others” referenced in the
above quote might include, it is at least plausible that the concurring
Justices deliberately left room to rein in the actions of other government
actors, such as public employers, with respect to GPS monitoring. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly deemed the Fourth Amendment applicable to all
types of government actors, including employers.185
Finally, if the concurring opinions in Jones are a guide, then length of
surveillance may become important in any Katz-based analysis of
employee tracking, particularly as it pertains to the scope of that
surveillance.186 According to the five concurring Justices in Jones,
tracking a person’s vehicle via GPS for twenty-eight days constituted a
search under the Katz test (and hence a Fourth Amendment violation due
to the lack of a valid warrant or applicable warrant exception).187 These
180. Some courts have described Jones as signaling “a particular concern for government
trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment]
enumerates.” United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2012)
(alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779–80 (6th Cir. 2012). In a case
where law enforcement “pinged” a suspect’s phone to determine its location, the court
distinguished Jones on the grounds that “[n]o such physical intrusion [of the suspect’s phone]
occurred in [this] case. [The suspect] himself obtained the cell phone for the purpose of
communication, and that phone included the GPS technology used to track the phone’s
whereabouts.” Id.
182. See infra notes 346–49 and accompanying text.
183. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
184. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
185. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
186. Many lower courts post-Jones have applied Katz in cases where no trespass has
occurred. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 109–10 (S.D. 2017) (“But this case does not
concern a physical trespass; therefore, the Katz analysis controls [due to the opinions expressed
in Jones].”). In addition, courts have recognized that length of surveillance is a critical factor in
such a case. Cf. United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 2016) (“If a cell-site simulator
is like a GPS tracker, and if the approach of the concurring opinions in Jones is adopted, then it
would be necessary to know how long the police used a simulator while searching for Patrick and
just how accurate is the location information it provides.”).
187. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Justices did not identify the precise point at which the tracking became a
search, but simply declared that “the line was surely crossed before the
4-week mark.”188 As a result, criminal suspects—–and perhaps
government employees as well—–can arguably expect not to be tracked
by GPS for such a lengthy period of time.189 At the other end of the
spectrum, the Court’s prior holding in United States v. Knotts190 suggests
that a person traveling on public roads for just a few hours cannot
reasonably expect privacy in those movements,191 a decision Jones was
careful not to overrule.192 In the wake of Jones, the line between these
two points remains unclear,193 and, as explained below, is an issue that
resurfaces in cases involving GPS tracking by employers—albeit under
the separate question of whether an employer investigation is reasonable
in scope.194 With these principles in mind, this Article next examines
instances of GPS tracking by employers.
III. GPS TRACKING BY EMPLOYERS
As noted, the Supreme Court in O’Connor adopted rules governing
both investigations of work-related misconduct and searches conducted

188. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the Alito concurrence that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy’”).
189. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *4 (D.
Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (“When considering the legality under the Fourth Amendment of long-term
video surveillance of an individual’s activities or home, unquestionably the various opinions
issued by the Justices in Jones require serious and careful consideration.”).
190. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
191. Id. at 281–82, 285. In Knotts, the Court upheld the warrantless use of a beeper to track
a drum of chloroform from the defendant’s point of purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away. Id.
at 285. According to the Court, the use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the
beeper did not provide any information police could not have obtained through visual surveillance
along the vehicle’s route. Id. at 281–82. Just one year after Knotts, the Court in United States v.
Karo examined a similar case and reached the opposite result as in Knotts, primarily because the
beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a private residence. United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984).
192. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (distinguishing Knotts as a case where the Court’s trespass
concerns did not apply because “[t]he beeper had been placed in the container before it came into
Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner”); see also United States v. Figueroa-Cruz,
914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that Jones did not overrule Knotts, but rather
distinguished it based on “the ownership or exclusivity of use of the chattel” at issue).
193. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Justice Alito’s
concurrence and the majority in Jones both recognized that there is little precedent for what
constitutes a level of comprehensive tracking that would violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
194. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. 2013)
(striking down an instance of GPS tracking by an employer due to its duration).
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for noninvestigatory work-related purposes.195 This section addresses
employer use of GPS tracking in both scenarios.
A. GPS Tracking on an Individualized Basis to Investigate
Employee Wrongdoing
Jones was decided in January 2012.196 Two years later, the Court of
Appeals of New York applied Jones to an instance of GPS tracking
conducted by the State of New York in its capacity as an employer.197
The opinion is significant because, although it applied the Jones
majority’s trespass-based test to the initial “search” question and found
an obvious search on facts similar to Jones,198 it ultimately declared the
search unlawful due to its duration.199
The employee in the New York case, Michael Cunningham, became
a state employee in 1980.200 In 2008, suspecting that Cunningham was
submitting false time sheets and taking unauthorized absences from work,
the New York State Department of Labor (the Department) attached a
GPS device to Cunningham’s car, without his knowledge, while the car
was parked in a lot near the Department’s offices.201 The device was then
used to track the vehicle’s movements for thirty days, including evenings,
weekends, and several days when Cunningham was on vacation in
another state.202 GPS information showed that Cunningham’s arrival and
departure times from work were not consistent with the number of hours
he claimed on his time sheets.203 On the strength of this and other
evidence,204 the Department brought thirteen charges of misconduct
against Cunningham,205 eight of which were dependent on evidence
obtained from the GPS device.206 Cunningham then sought to suppress
195. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987).
196. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
197. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470–71, 475.
198. See id. at 475.
199. See id. at 473.
200. Id. at 470 (stating that in 2008, the New York State Department of Labor conducted an
initial investigation of Cunningham which resulted in a two-month suspension, and that during
this investigation, Cunningham successfully eluded an investigator who was following his car,
prompting the Department to contact the Office of the State Inspector General about the matter,
which then conducted an independent investigation of Cunningham).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (stating that as part of the investigation, the state Inspector General conducted
surveillance of an apartment building Cunningham was suspected of visiting during working
hours, obtained subpoenas for E-ZPass records, and interviewed Cunningham and his secretary).
205. Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 933 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011),
rev’d, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013).
206. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470.
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the GPS evidence, but the Hearing Officer overseeing his administrative
proceeding denied the motion.207 The Hearing Officer then found enough
proof to sustain eleven of the thirteen charges and recommended
termination of Cunningham’s employment, which occurred shortly
thereafter.208
Cunningham appealed his termination in court, arguing that the GPS
tracking of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment such that the data
obtained from that surveillance should have been suppressed.209
Applying Jones, the court first held that the GPS tracking of
Cunningham’s vehicle was a search under the Fourth Amendment.210
However, the court declared (correctly) that Jones did not resolve the
separate question of “when, if ever, a GPS search is permissible in the
absence of a search warrant,” recognizing further that the employmentspecific framework set forth in O’Connor v. Ortega would govern.211
As in O’Connor, the court determined that the warrant requirement
does not apply in the employment context, such that the failure to secure
a warrant before attaching the GPS device to Cunningham’s car was not
dispositive.212 Nevertheless, the court deemed the search unreasonable.213
Applying the O’Connor framework, the court deemed the search justified
at its inception because Cunningham’s employer had “ample grounds to
suspect him of submitting false time records.”214 However, the court
deemed the search unreasonable in scope as it involved “excessively
intrusive,” round-the-clock surveillance of Cunningham’s vehicle,215
which encompassed “much activity with which the State had no
legitimate concern—i.e., it tracked [Cunningham] on all evenings, on all
weekends and on vacation[,]” capturing a great deal of purely private
activity.216
In the most striking portion of the opinion, the court then addressed
the fact that no evidence obtained from surveillance conducted outside of
business hours was used against Cunningham in his disciplinary
proceeding, and whether, in light of that fact, suppression of GPS data

207. Cunningham, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
208. Id.
209. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d 468 (No. 2013-0123).
210. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 471.
211. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)) (finding that the New York
Court of Appeals also applies the O’Connor test to analyze the constitutionality of searches
conducted by public employers under the New York Constitution).
212. Id. at 472.
213. Id. at 473.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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obtained during business hours was necessary.217 On this point, the court
reasoned:
Ordinarily, when a search has exceeded its permissible
scope, the suppression of items found during the permissible
portion of the search is not required. But we hold that rule to
be inapplicable to GPS searches like the present one, in light
of the extraordinary capacity of a GPS device to permit
“[c]onstant, relentless tracking of anything.” Where an
employer conducts a GPS search without making a
reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of
business hours, the search as a whole must be considered
unreasonable. That conclusion concededly requires
suppression of [all] GPS evidence here. . . .218
When read in light of Quon (the text message case described in Part
I.A. above), the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Cunningham
seems incorrect, but the decision becomes more defensible when viewed
through the lens of the concurring opinions in Jones. Both Quon and
Cunningham involved employer-initiated investigations of potential
work misconduct by an employee.219 In both cases, the employee was
either deemed or assumed to have a legitimate expectation of privacy
under the circumstances of the case, making the reasonableness of the
employer’s actions the controlling issue.220 Moreover, the courts in both
cases ruled that the employer’s investigatory action was reasonable at its
inception given the employer’s reasonable suspicion that the search
would uncover evidence of work misconduct.221 The opinions thus
differed only on the final step of the O’Connor analysis: whether the
employer’s investigatory conduct was reasonable in scope.222
In Quon, a Supreme Court opinion that should control Fourth
Amendment employer-search cases like Cunningham, the Court deemed
the review of the employee’s text messages reasonable in scope because
of the limited nature of the review, including the fact that evidence of the
employee’s activities while off duty was redacted from his disciplinary
proceedings.223 Arguably the same result should have been reached in
Cunningham, as the data obtained from the times when Cunningham was
217. Id.
218. Id. at 473 (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Clark, 891 F.2d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Constantine, 613
N.E.2d 511, 511 (N.Y. 1993)).
219. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010); Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470.
220. Quon, 560 U.S. at 750; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472.
221. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473.
222. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473.
223. Quon, 560 U.S. at 762.
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off duty had been redacted from his disciplinary proceedings.224 Yet, the
Cunningham court did not follow Quon on this point, and instead deemed
the search unreasonable in its entirety.225 The Cunningham court’s
departure from Quon is likely due to the same underlying concerns with
respect to GPS tracking that troubled the concurring Justices in Jones—
namely, the potential for GPS tracking to unveil vast amounts of private
information that realistically could not be obtained through traditional
means of surveillance, such as trailing a vehicle turn-by-turn.226 For
employers, then, the obvious lesson from Cunningham is to limit their
use of GPS tracking to investigations of employees that are based on a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and to avoid collecting GPS data
not truly necessary to corroborate that suspicion.
From an employer perspective, the most important issue with respect
to GPS tracking of an employee concerns the permissible length of
surveillance, as there is no doubt that in light of Jones, GPS tracking by
way of surreptitiously installed GPS triggers Fourth Amendment
protection.227 As courts and commentators have recognized, the Supreme
Court in Jones did not resolve the question of whether long-term GPS
surveillance is unconstitutional, particularly in cases where GPS tracking
is accomplished in the absence of a trespass.228 In the employment

224. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473.
225. Id.
226. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. . . . The government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information
years into the future.”); see also Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 474 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring)
(recognizing that GPS is vastly more intrusive than simply following a car, and stating that “GPS
is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity,” given that it permits tracking and data
capture over “a practically unlimited period,” and that “[t]he potential for a similar capture of
information or ‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require, at a minimum, millions of additional
police officers and cameras on every street lamp” (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195,
1199 (N.Y. 2009))).
227. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
228. See id. at 412 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case
does not require us to answer that question.”); see also United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 1410296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (recognizing that legality of
longer-term video surveillance of an individual’s home or activities was not resolved in Jones);
United States v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842 (D. Ariz. 2012) (recognizing that Jones left
open for “some future case” the question whether the Supreme Court “is willing to accept the
principle that Government surveillance can implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy over time”); State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 113 (S.D. 2017) (“[T]his case concerns longterm, remote surveillance, and there is no controlling law on that question.”); Carniol v. N.Y.C.
Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“[T]he Court [in Jones]
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context, this same length-of-surveillance issue resurfaces in the question
of what makes an instance of GPS tracking unreasonable in scope.229
Although the following proposals will be outlined more fully below,
for instances in which employees are suspected of work-related
misconduct, this Article proposes that the best approach for employers to
follow—one that accounts for the concerns of the concurring Justices in
Jones and of the entire Cunningham court—is to track an employee via
GPS only as a means of corroborating an allegation of serious employee
misconduct. Even then, an employer should utilize this technique only
after exhausting alternative investigation methods, and only to the extent
necessary to justify an adverse employment action against the offending
employee. To further account for the concerns of the Cunningham court,
which emphasized the need for an employer to “mak[e] a reasonable
effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours,”230 an
employer should seek to avoid uncovering purely private activity
unconnected to work obligations by, for example, shutting off the GPS
tracking device during nonworking hours. Finally, from a temporal
standpoint, the employer should only track an employee’s vehicle long
enough to obtain the information necessary to corroborate a suspicion of
wrongdoing.
Borrowed from the criminal context, this proposed framework finds
support in the Supreme Court’s framework for elevating an allegation of
wrongdoing through corroboration of an informant’s tip, one that if
applied by employers, would minimize their potential liability by limiting
the intrusiveness of this investigative device.
The Supreme Court’s corroboration-based framework derives largely
from its decision in Illinois v. Gates,231 which the Court applied in the
context of establishing probable cause232 and expanded, in Alabama v.
White,233 to encompass circumstances where the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a less intrusive search or
seizure.234 The investigations in both Gates and White began with a tip
from an anonymous informant.235 Because an anonymous informant’s tip

merely determined that such GPS monitoring was a search but it did not address whether the
search was reasonable.”), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
229. See Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473 (deeming an instance of GPS tracking by an
employer unreasonable due to its duration).
230. Id.
231. 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983).
232. See id. at 230.
233. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
234. See id. at 328–29.
235. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225; White, 496 U.S. at 326–27.
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is usually insufficient to establish probable cause,236 police must typically
corroborate certain aspects of the tip in order to conduct a more extensive
search or seizure via warrant.237
Prior to Gates and White, Supreme Court precedent had been read to
require police to ascertain both the tipster’s “basis of
knowledge”(typically consisting of details regarding exactly how the
tipster obtained the provided information) as well as his or her “veracity”
or “reliability”(usually established through evidence that the informant is
credible or reliable).238 Abandoning that so-called “two-pronged test,”
the Court in Gates ruled that probable cause could be established via an
informant’s tip through a “totality of the circumstances” approach,239 one
that accounts for the fact that “[i]nformants’ tips . . . come in many
shapes and sizes”240 and ultimately recognizes that a deficiency in either
the “reliability” or “basis of knowledge” prong may be compensated for
by a strong showing as to the other, or even by some other indicia of
reliability.241 The Court noted, for example, that if a particular informant
is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of
illegal activity, his failure to thoroughly explain the basis of his
knowledge in a particular case should not serve as an absolute bar to a
finding of probable cause based on the tip.242
The true significance of Gates, insofar as employers are concerned, is
the Court’s recognition of the vital role that independent corroboration of
an allegation of wrongdoing plays in developing the suspicion necessary
to conduct a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.243 As the Gates Court
recognized, ordinary persons “generally do not provide extensive
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,” and “the veracity
of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown,
and unknowable,” yet many of those tips, “particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation,” are necessary tools
for solving “otherwise ‘perfect crimes.’”244 From there, the Court readily
determined that independent corroboration of the details of an
236. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 227 (agreeing that standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to
the police in that case would not provide the basis for a magistrate’s determination that probable
cause existed).
237. See id. at 241–46 (discussing the importance of corroboration).
238. Id. at 227–29 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Court’s prior
precedent on this issue: Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), abrogated by Gates, 462
U.S. 213; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), abrogated by Gates, 462 U.S. 213).
239. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 238.
240. Id. at 232.
241. Id. at 214, 233.
242. Id. at 233.
243. Id. at 241.
244. Id. at 237–38.
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informant’s tip could elevate a facially deficient allegation of wrongdoing
into one that rises to the level of probable cause.245
More relevant to the employment context, which dispenses with the
requirement of probable cause, the Gates corroboration framework was
later expanded to cases involving reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard
of suspicion often applied in the employment context.246 The Court
considered this issue in Alabama v. White.247
In White, an anonymous informant called police and stated that a
person named Vanessa White would be leaving a specific apartment
(235-C) in a specific apartment building (235), at a specific time, in a
brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight; the
informant added that White would then drive to a certain motel in
possession of an ounce of cocaine in a brown attaché case.248 Officers
went immediately to the apartment building and observed a station wagon
that fit the informant’s description.249 Officers then saw a woman exit
apartment building 235, but, they did not verify exactly which apartment
unit the woman exited from.250 Further, the officers did not observe a
brown attaché case; the woman appeared empty-handed.251 At this point,
the woman entered the station wagon and began to drive in the direction
of the motel specified by the informant.252 Officers stopped the station
wagon before it reached the motel and informed the driver, White, that
she had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in
the vehicle.253 Officers then obtained White’s consent to search the
vehicle, where they found a brown attaché case, which they opened with
her consent.254 Inside the case, officers discovered marijuana, prompting
White’s arrest on marijuana charges.255
In her ensuing prosecution, White argued that the brief investigatory
stop of her vehicle was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, such that
the marijuana found in her vehicle had to be suppressed.256 When White’s
Fourth Amendment claim reached the Supreme Court, the Court
addressed the issue of whether the corroborated tip “exhibited sufficient
245. Id. at 241–44.
246. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
247. 496 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1990).
248. Id. at 327.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See White v. State, 550 So. 2d 1074, 1075, 1079 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), writ denied,
550 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 1989), and rev’d, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
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indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion” to stop White’s
vehicle.257 Although this particular investigatory stop required only
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause,258 the Court analyzed
the issue using the same corroboration-based framework used in Gates.259
Similar to the tip in Gates, the Court noted that the tip in White
provided virtually no information regarding the tipster’s reliability, nor
did it provide any indication of the basis for the tipster’s knowledge
regarding White’s criminal activities.260 As such, the tip alone would not
have justified the Terry stop of White’s vehicle.261 Yet, as in Gates, police
corroborated many aspects of the tip, including the fact that a vehicle
fitting the tipster’s description was parked outside the described
apartment building; a woman fitting the tipster’s description came out of
the specified apartment building (rather than the particular apartment);
the woman got into the car and drove in the direction of the motel, as the
tipster had predicted; and this all occurred within the time frame specified
by the informant.262
This corroboration of seemingly innocent details is significant, in the
Court’s words, “because [if] an informant is shown to be right about some
things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including
the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.”263 This
corroboration, therefore, “imparted some degree of reliability to the other
allegations made by the caller.”264 In addition, the Court noted that
although the tip in White was not as detailed as the one in Gates, and
although the corroboration was not as complete in White as in Gates, the
required degree of suspicion in White—reasonable suspicion as opposed
to probable cause—was also not as high.265 Finally, the Court emphasized
that, in White, as in Gates, the tip included details regarding the suspect’s
future actions not easily predicted by members of the general public who
do not possess “inside information” about the suspect’s future affairs.
This information included the fact that White would shortly leave the
apartment building, get in the car, and drive in the direction of the
motel.266 This accurate prediction of White’s future activities thus made
257. White, 496 U.S. at 326–27.
258. Id. at 328 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
259. See id. at 328–29.
260. Id. at 329.
261. Id. (“Simply put, a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not ‘“warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief” that [a stop] was appropriate.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22)).
262. Id. at 331.
263. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983)).
264. Id. at 332.
265. Id. at 329.
266. Id. at 332.
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it “reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such
information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that
individual’s illegal activities.”267 In the end, such corroboration of an
otherwise deficient tip gave police “reason to believe not only that the
caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough
to justify the stop.”268
In the employment context, similar to cases like Gates and White,
allegations of employee wrongdoing are often initiated by laypersons
rather than professional investigators, and are then investigated further by
company officials.269 For relatively small employers, these complainants
may be “known” to the investigating officials, and although this may not
be the case may not be in larger corporations, in either event
complainants’ “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” will often be central
to the investigation.270 Such a scenario may arise, for example, in
workplace harassment cases, and may also arise in other instances of
alleged employee wrongdoing that might prompt an investigator to utilize
methods of employee tracking, such as falsifying time sheets.271
Although an informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge will not
always be at issue in the employment context, the important point is that
when an investigation is initiated based upon the report of an aggrieved
coworker or customer, or even based upon an anonymous individual’s
complaint, the corroboration principles espoused in cases like Gates and
White would serve as a useful guide to employers.
For investigations of alleged workplace misconduct, this Article
proposes that to be reasonable at its inception, an employer should track
an employee by surreptitiously installed GPS only if the employee under
investigation has allegedly committed a terminable offense, and only if
the employer has been unable to corroborate an allegation of employee
wrongdoing through some other means. Finally, this Article proposes that
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (analyzing an employer
search of an employee’s workplace computer to investigate alleged workplace misconduct first
reported by an anonymous informant); see also Smith v. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085, 1089–90
(E.D. Tenn. 1987), aff’d, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that in an employment
context,“[r]easonable suspicion may be based on statements made by other employees and tips
from informants”).
270. See, e.g., Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620, 625 (10th Cir. 1996)
(discussing a challenge to a known informant’s reliability in the context of establishing the
reasonable suspicion necessary to perform employment-related drug tests); Reeves v. Singleton,
994 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no reasonable suspicion based on an
uncorroborated anonymous tip identifying plaintiff-employee as a drug user).
271. See generally Greer v. McCormick, No. 14-CV-13596, 2017 WL 1315718, at *15–20
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2017) (discussing the importance of corroborating an anonymous
informant’s tip in the employment context).
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this form of GPS tracking should be limited to scenarios where it would
be reasonable to believe that tracking the employee would in fact
corroborate a report of employee wrongdoing. For example, if an
employee is reported to have harassed a coworker at work, tracking the
alleged wrongdoer outside of work would not be reasonable. If, however,
an employee is reported to have harassed a coworker by stalking her after
work hours at a local gym, GPS tracking might be a reasonable means of
corroborating those allegations.272 In combination, these requirements
will ensure that employees suspected of committing relatively minor
offenses are not subjected to this intrusive form of investigation, which
will only be used by an employer when truly necessary.
Regarding the separate O’Connor requirement of being reasonable in
scope, this Article proposes that once employed, GPS tracking of an
employee should avoid uncovering purely private activity unconnected
to work obligations or alleged workplace misconduct and should not
extend any longer than truly necessary to corroborate the suspected
wrongdoing. These principles are embedded in cases like Quon and
Cunningham, which emphasize the obligation of employers to limit the
scope of any employer-initiated investigation pursuant to the framework
set forth in O’Connor v. Ortega,273 and Jones, which reflects an acute
concern for limiting the duration of such highly-invasive GPS tracking.
In sum, employers should consider surreptitious GPS tracking an illsuited means of investigating most instances of employee wrongdoing.
And even where the method may be appropriate, employers should utilize
this highly intrusive investigative technique only as a last resort, and only
insofar as is truly necessary to corroborate an allegation of serious
misconduct.
Although the above proposals apply to employees’ personal vehicles,
this framework should generally remain the same when an employee is
tracked in a company-owned vehicle via surreptitiously installed GPS.
Although it is true that expectations of privacy in the employment context
may shift depending on who owns the property subject to intrusion,274
272. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(2) (2018) (establishing an exception to a statutory
requirement that an employer must provide written notice to any potentially affected employees
prior to engaging in electronic monitoring on the employer’s premises for situations “[w]hen (A)
an employer has reasonable grounds to believe that employees are engaged in conduct which (i)
violates the law, (ii) violates the legal rights of the employer or the employer’s employees, or (iii)
creates a hostile workplace environment, and (B) electronic monitoring may produce evidence of
this misconduct, the employer may conduct monitoring without giving prior written notice”).
273. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761–63 (2010); Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t
of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 472–73 (N.Y. 2013).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no
legitimate expectation of privacy in employee’s Internet use when employer’s known policy
allowed monitoring of “all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); United
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this factor will more likely alter the outcome when ownership is
accompanied by notice and employee consent.275 Notice and consent are
not present, however, when a GPS device is secretly used to track an
employee through the type of surreptitious installation that occurred in
Cunningham and Jones.276
When notice and consent are present, courts have rejected privacybased claims where an employer attaches a GPS tracking device to an
employer-owned vehicle and uses that device to track the vehicle’s
movements, albeit often in cases not involving investigations of
individual employee misconduct, as where an employer’s entire fleet of
vehicles are tracked via GPS.277 Employer ownership has also played a
role in cases involving investigations of employee wrongdoing. In one
such case, Elgin v. St. Louis Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,278 the court granted
summary judgment to an employer on an intrusion claim that was brought
against the employer after the employer surreptitiously attached a GPS
device to its company-owned van, which was driven by the plaintiff, to
investigate potential employee theft.279 The Elgin court found no
“substantial intrusion upon [the] plaintiff’s seclusion” because the GPS
tracker “revealed no more than highly public information as to the van’s
location.”280 In addition, the court declared that “defendant’s use of the
tracking device on its own vehicle does not rise to the level of being
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”281

States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that public school employee
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails between him and his wife that were stored
on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his computer were subject to
inspection, which he acknowledged).
275. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in
employee’s Internet use when employer’s known policy allowed monitoring of “all file transfers,
all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (finding that
public school employee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails between him and
his wife that were stored on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his
computer were subject to inspection, which he acknowledged).
276. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (noting that law enforcement
officers “installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage” of a vehicle to track a suspect’s
movements); Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470 (stating that investigators covertly attached a GPS
device to an employee’s car).
277. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Wynne Transp. Servs. Inc., No. H-06-0360, 2007 WL 1189640, at
*2, *10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (finding no viable invasion of privacy claim where plaintiff’s
employer-owned commercial truck was outfitted with a GPS device that regularly transmitted the
truck’s location to the employer, which the employer used to determine whether its drivers were
exceeding legal limitations on the number of hours they could drive).
278. No. 4:05CV970-DJS, 2005 WL 305063 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2005).
279. Id. at *1.
280. Id. at *4.
281. Id.
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The result in Elgin is striking because the employer in that case
tracked the van driven by the plaintiff in order to investigate cash
shortages in machines the plaintiff serviced (a potentially criminal
offense), and did not notify the plaintiff that it had done so until after he
had been cleared of any wrongdoing,282 such that notice and consent did
not factor into the court’s decision.283 Nevertheless, because Elgin was
decided several years before Jones, in an era in which most courts had
drastically downplayed the privacy concerns inherent in surreptitious
forms of GPS tracking,284 the case does not compel alteration of the
framework proposed above. In the end, employer ownership is just one
of many factors to consider in any given investigation and does not in and
of itself dictate Fourth Amendment outcomes.285
B. GPS Tracking of a Segment of Employees for Legitimate
Business Reasons
Having established a framework for employers to follow when
investigating employee wrongdoing, this Article next examines GPS
tracking for noninvestigatory work-related purposes.286
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individualized suspicion is
generally required to make someone the target of a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure, particularly when performed as part of a criminal
investigation.287 Given the historical development of the Fourth
Amendment right–—which was arguably created to prevent wideranging searches through the use of general warrants288–—so-called
282. See id. at *1.
283. See id. at *4.
284. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
285. Demonstrating that the ownership factor alone does not determine expectations of
privacy, courts have sometimes ruled that an employee enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in
an employer-owned device, and on the other hand have found no Fourth Amendment protection
in a personally-owned device. Compare, e.g., United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248–49
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a
personal computer he used at work), with, e.g., United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234,
236, 238–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in his work
computer even though the computer was formally owned by his employer).
286. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (adopting a framework for analyzing
searches performed for “either a noninvestigatory work-related” purpose or to investigate
“suspected work-related employee misfeasance”).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821–36 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
the requirement of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment case law, including cases in
which the requirement has been abandoned).
288. See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 941 (2002) (“Although the [Fourth]
Amendment's text bans only general warrants, the ‘larger purpose for which the Framers adopted
the text [was] to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers.’” (alteration in original)
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“fishing expeditions for evidence” are generally considered
unconstitutional, particularly those performed without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing.289
Given these fundamental Fourth Amendment principles, any
employer program that subjects a large segment of employees to
continual GPS surveillance should be used with caution. Yet, as with
other “special needs” scenarios involving widespread searches, such as
airport security screenings, an investigative method is not automatically
unreasonable simply because it is applied to a large number of individuals
in the absence of individualized suspicion.290 Given that employerinitiated searches generally fall into this special needs category, GPS
tracking of a segment of employees might be reasonable, particularly
when performed for legitimate “work-related, noninvestigatory reasons”
apart from any investigation into workplace misconduct, even where the
data obtained is later used to discipline an individual employee.291

(quoting Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
553, 555 (1999)). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 771–72 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment contains no actual warrant
requirement and that “at times, the Founders viewed judges and certain judicial proceedings with
suspicion,” adding that “[t]he Amendment's Warrant Clause does not require, presuppose, or even
encourage warrants—it limits them” by imposing strict standards on their issuance). Contra
Davies, at 591–619 (rejecting Amar's reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment as “based
in large measure on erroneous historical premises”).
289. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 560, 566 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause of protecting
against general searches and complaining that officers, by their own admission, engaged in a
“fishing expedition for evidence of unidentified criminal activity committed by unspecified
persons,” which “was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent”); see also
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981) (“The central objectionable feature of both
[the general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs of assistance used in the
Colonies] was that they provided no judicial check on the determination of the executing officials
that the evidence available justified an intrusion into any particular home.”).
290. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other
official buildings.”); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (“When
the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in
the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness,
so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like
damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability
to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.” (quoting United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring))).
291. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (stating that the reasonableness
inquiry would not be particularly rigorous and that public employers should be afforded “wide
latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons”).
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Another recent New York case, Carniol v. The New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission,292 illustrates these principles.
In Carniol, petitioner Robert Carniol sued The New York City Taxi
and Limousine Commission (TLC), arguing that the city’s use of GPS
technology to track its taxi drivers violated the New York Constitution,
and that the fruits of that violation could not be used as evidence in
disciplinary actions against individual taxi drivers.293 According to
Carniol’s complaint, the TLC mandated in 2007 that all New York City
medallion taxi cabs be equipped with a Taxi Technology System (TTS)
that included a GPS system.294 As originally developed, the intent of the
TTS system was to collect information for the TLC’s regulatory analysis.
The goals were to gather data regarding pick-up and drop-off points, to
assess trip time and distance, to eliminate the need for drivers to complete
handwritten trip sheets, and to assist in locating a passenger’s lost
property.295 Given its administrative purposes, the TLC never stated that
it would use the information it gathered for investigatory purposes.296
Yet, after receiving complaints that passengers were being overcharged
by a certain driver, the TLC conducted a comprehensive review of the
data generated by the TTS system for essentially all of its 42,000 cab
drivers, including Carniol.297 As a result, the TLC determined that more
than 21,000 drivers, including Carniol, had overcharged passengers by
charging the higher out of town rate for trips within New York City.298
Having determined that Carniol had overcharged passengers ninetyone times, the TLC commenced an administrative proceeding to revoke
his TLC license.299 Following a trial, an Administrative Law Judge issued
a report and recommendation finding Carniol guilty of the charges against
him and recommending revocation of his license.300 The judge
specifically found that Carniol had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the trip information gathered by the TLC, which had properly searched
the records it lawfully possessed.301 Shortly thereafter, Carniol’s taxi
driver’s license was revoked.302

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

975 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 126 A.D.3d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 846.
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Carniol subsequently challenged the revocation, arguing that the
TLC’s use of GPS tracking violated his Fourth Amendment rights.303 As
an initial matter, the New York Supreme Court recognized that
individuals “who choose to participate in a heavily regulated industry,
such as the taxicab industry, have a diminished expectation of privacy,
particularly in information related to the goals of the industry
regulation,”304 such that Carniol could not legitimately expect privacy in
the trip data that had been gathered by GPS.305
The court went on to find that even if it assumed that Carniol could
expect privacy, the TLC’s GPS tracking program would have been
“reasonable” in light of the competing interests at stake.306 According to
the court, Carniol’s “privacy interest” in the GPS-generated trip data is
“minimal,” and the “intrusion is also minimal,” given that “[i]t does not
involve a physical intrusion into Carniol’s body or home” and does not
collect data regarding his whereabouts while off-duty.307 When weighed
against the “substantial” “government interest in improving taxi customer
service and [the] ability to regulate it by using modern methods to
promote passenger and driver safety,” the court had no difficulty finding
the TLC’s actions reasonable.308 Distinguishing Jones, which involved
the surreptitious and trespassory attachment of a GPS device to a criminal
suspect’s vehicle, the court further noted that the GPS monitoring here
was conducted with the knowledge and consent of the taxi driver and
“was narrowly tailored to achieve a regulatory goal.”309 The court then
re-emphasized that the GPS system did “not record information about the
driver’s personal life.”310 Accordingly, even if Carniol could legitimately
expect privacy in the GPS data, the search would have been reasonable.311
For purposes of the instant analysis, five things are noteworthy
regarding Carniol. First, because the GPS system at issue was installed
with the knowledge and consent of the city’s taxi drivers, the use of that
system was not governed by Jones, leaving only the question of whether
a “search” occurred pursuant to the Katz reasonable expectation of

303. Id. (noting that Carniol also brought a similar state law claim).
304. Id. at 848 (quoting Buliga v. N.Y.C. Taxi Limousine Comm’n, No. 07 Civ. 6507 (DLC),
2007 WL 4547738, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007)).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 848–49 (quoting Buliga, 2007 WL 4547738, at *3).
307. Id. at 849.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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privacy test.312 Second, taxi drivers subject to GPS monitoring could not
reasonably expect privacy under Katz, at least in part because of their
consent.313 Third, that same consent contributed to the court’s ultimate
determination that the employer’s wholesale GPS monitoring of its taxi
drivers was reasonable.314 Fourth, the legitimate government interests at
issue—to regulate and improve the taxi industry and to enhance the safety
and convenience of the driver and the passengers—tilted the scale of
reasonableness in the employer’s direction.315 Finally, the fact that no
data was collected regarding Carniol’s personal life, including his off
duty whereabouts, made the GPS surveillance relatively unintrusive, and
hence more likely to be deemed reasonable.316
Carniol’s combination of employee consent to the GPS monitoring
program, the existence of legitimate business purposes necessitating the
use of GPS, and the employer’s decision not to collect GPS data while
employees are off duty, are in essence the key guidelines for employers
to follow in using across-the-board GPS tracking programs. When
adopted, these ingredients will ensure both that the monitoring remains
reasonable at its inception (that is, based upon employee consent and
performed for a legitimate business reason) and reasonable in scope (that
is, not excessively intrusive given that it does not encompass off-duty
activity).317 Moreover, Carniol reveals that when an employer tracks an
entire segment of employees in a reasonable manner through GPS, the
employer may then utilize the GPS data it acquires to discipline
individual employees for misconduct that data reveals.318 Quite simply,

312. See id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (“Situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”).
313. Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (emphasizing that the taxicab industry is heavily
regulated, which reduces expectations of privacy, and that “the TTS system was installed with the
knowledge of the taxicab owners and all taxicab drivers are required to follow TLC regulations
which mandate the use of the TTS system”).
314. See id. at 848–49.
315. See id. at 849.
316. See id.
317. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
318. See Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 845–46, 851; see also Tubbs v. Wynne Transp. Servs.
Inc., No. H-06-0360, 2007 WL 1189640, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (finding no viable
invasion of privacy claim where plaintiff’s employer-owned commercial truck was outfitted with
a GPS device that regularly transmitted the truck’s location to the employer, which the employer
used to determine whether its drivers were exceeding legal limitations on the number of hours
they could drive); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 330 (Conn. 2010) (involving a
case, dismissed on unrelated grounds, brought by city fire inspectors who were disciplined for
improper job performance, “which was detected through the [employers’] use of global
positioning system devices (GPS devices) without the [employees’] knowledge”).
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because the GPS tracking itself is not unlawful, the employer’s
subsequent use of its own GPS data is not unlawful either.319
The same variables present in Carniol—consent, legitimate business
reasons, and narrow scope—are, in the author’s view, the necessary
ingredients of a lawful system of employer-initiated cell phone tracking,
a topic addressed in the next section.
IV. TRACKING EMPLOYEES THROUGH THEIR CELL PHONES
This section examines the most common types of cell phone tracking
that exist today. It then considers how employers may use cell phones to
lawfully track the locations of their employees.
A. Cell Phone Tracking Methods
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Jones generally requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device to a
suspect’s vehicle as part of a criminal investigation.320 As a result, law
enforcement officials have turned to more sophisticated methods of
location tracking, including tracking through cell phones.321 Given that
law enforcement can typically monitor a cell phone’s location without
having to commit a trespass upon it, this method of investigation is
generally subject to fewer constitutional constraints as compared to the
more traditional form of GPS tracking that occurred in Jones and
Cunningham.322
Cell phone tracking by law enforcement comes in two primary forms.
One common form occurs through the acquisition of cell site location
data.323 Under this method, which does not involve a trespass,324 police
319. See Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (denying Carniol’s motion in its entirety).
320. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
321. See Jonathan Bard, Unpacking the Dirtbox: Confronting Cell Phone Location Tracking
with the Fourth Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 731, 744 (2016) (“GPS devices remain a popular
option for location tracking, but this attachment-based technology presents practical and legal
obstacles. [As such,] [l]aw enforcement is increasingly turning to cell phone tracking as an
appealing alternative to attachment-based tracking devices.” (footnote omitted)).
322. See Christian Bennardo, The Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic
Theory, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2396–401 (2017) (examining judicial trends in cell site
location tracking cases).
323. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502–03 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing this type
of data).
324. See id. at 514 (distinguishing Jones on this point) (“The government’s obtaining
MetroPCS records, showing historical cell tower locations, did not involve a physical intrusion
on private property or a search at all. The records belonged to a private company . . . [and] were
obtained through a court order authorized by a federal statute, not by means of governmental
trespass.”); see also United States v. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp. 3d 896, 911 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (“The
court concludes that the government's collection of cell tower location data from the cell phone
provider does not constitute a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment [because] [t]he collection of
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are able to obtain cell phone location data by identifying which cell tower
communicated with the phone when the phone was used to make a call,
send a text or e-mail, or engage in other data transmission functions.325
When accumulated over a period of time, such cell site location data—
which can be incredibly comprehensive given the number of times a
typical cell phone is used each day—allows a person reviewing the data
to infer both the phone’s and the user’s location at numerous times
throughout the day.326 Cell phone companies maintain records of this
information,327 making it possible for law enforcement to request either
“historical” or “real-time” cell-site information.328
With historical cell-site information, law enforcement may request all
such data accumulated over a period of time in the past, whereas with
real-time data, law enforcement may seek to obtain this information on a
real-time basis into the future.329 In one recent robbery investigation, for
example, the Government obtained 129 days of historical cell-site
location information from one suspect’s wireless providers. The
Government then used this information as evidence of the suspect’s
seemingly incriminating location with respect to four robberies.330
Prior to June 2018, government officials generally did not need a
warrant to acquire historical cell-site location data331 as most courts had
ruled that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs in that instance, either
under the trespass test or under the reasonable expectation of privacy
the data does not involve a trespass upon an individual’s person or property, nor into a physical
area in which the person has established a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
325. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
326. See id. at 2217–19; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If a user’s cell
phone has communicated with a particular cell-site, this strongly suggests that the user has
physically been within the particular cell-site’s geographical range.”).
327. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ell site information is clearly a business record
[because] [t]he cell service provider collects and stores historical cell site data for its own business
purposes, perhaps to monitor or optimize service on its network or to accurately bill its customers
for the segments of its network that they use.”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (“By technical and
practical necessity, cell-phone service providers keep historical records of which cell-sites each
of their users’ cell phones have communicated. The implication of these facts is that cellular
service providers have records of the geographic location of almost every American at almost
every time of day and night.”).
328. See United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2012).
329. See id.
330. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
331. See In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (concluding
that the government can seek judicial orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain
historical cell-site information on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 3

1312

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

test.332 In finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in such data, most
courts had invoked the Fourth Amendment’s assumption of risk rationale,
a principle that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information knowingly disclosed to a third party, such as a cell phone
provider.333
Overturning many of these decisions, in June 2018, the United States
Supreme Court refused to apply the assumption of risk doctrine to
historical cell-site location data in Carpenter v. United States.334 It held
that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site location
information],”335 such that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when
the FBI obtained detailed location information from a criminal suspect’s
wireless carriers.336 The Carpenter Court specifically rejected the
Government’s attempt to extend the third-party assumption of risk
doctrine to this type of cell phone data, explaining that “a detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every
moment, over several years,” which can be obtained through the
acquisition of historical cell site location data, “implicates privacy
concerns far beyond” those at issue in the Supreme Court’s previous
332. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding no Fourth
Amendment search when police obtained historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from
robbery suspects’ cell phone provider where the historical CSLI indicated which cell tower—
usually the one closest to the cell phone—transmitted a signal when the suspects used their cell
phones to make and receive calls and texts), abrogated by United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593
(4th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 428 (recognizing that the court’s holding on the CSLI issue “accords
with that of every other federal appellate court that has considered the Fourth Amendment
question before us,” and further noting that “the vast majority of federal district court judges”
have determined that no “search” occurs when police obtain historical cell site location data); In
re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (reaching a similar result as
Graham). See generally Bennardo, supra note 322 (examining judicial trends in cell-site location
tracking cases and noting that four of the five federal circuit courts that have addressed whether
cell phone customers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI have answered in the
negative).
333. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–89 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[F]or the
same reasons that Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numerical information at issue [in
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)], the defendants have no such expectation in the [CSLI]
locational information here”), rev’d, 138 U.S. 2206 (2018); see also United States v. Davis, 785
F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Defendant] has no objective[ly] reasonable expectation of
privacy in MetroPCS’s business records showing the cell tower locations that wirelessly
connected [defendant’s] calls.”). See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979)
(establishing, under the third-party assumption of risk doctrine, that an individual can claim “no
legitimate expectation of privacy” in information that he has voluntarily turned over to a third
party).
334. 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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third-party assumption of risk cases.337 The Carpenter Court further
emphasized that, unlike the Court’s prior third-party cases, a cell phone
user does “not truly share[]” the “trail of location data” routinely
generated by his or her cell phone, and thus does not voluntarily assume
the risk that such data will be compiled and transmitted to the
government.338
Beyond cell-site location data, an alternative method of cell phone
tracking is to utilize the phone’s internal GPS.339 Under this method, for
example, cell phone providers may monitor a phone’s location through
its internal GPS and transmit that information to law enforcement
anytime a user activates the GPS on her phone.340 Law enforcement may
also utilize this method without the cell phone provider’s assistance.341
Finally, smartphone apps offer location tracking or sharing services,
including, for example, Google Maps and Snapchat, and there are various
websites that claim to allow users to find a phone’s location.342 As such,
there are numerous ways in which an employee’s location might be
tracked via cell phone.
B. Using Cell Phone Apps to Track Employees
Of the various methods of cell phone tracking described in the
previous section, employers are most likely to track an employee’s cell
337. See id. at 2220.
338. See id.
339. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell
Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2012). According to
Rothstein, all cell phones sold since 2003 are GPS-enabled, making most phones today at least
potentially trackable. Id. at 493. However, a user can disable her phone’s GPS. Id. Moreover,
whether a phone transmits GPS data may depend on the network and on the phone's applications.
Id.
340. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428–29 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(describing this method); see also United States v. Jones, No. 2:12CR30-MEF, 2012 WL
2568200, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:12-CR030-MEF, 2012 WL 2568082 (M.D. Ala. July 3, 2012) (describing an investigation where police
obtained a warrant to receive “pings” with the location of a suspect’s cell phone for a thirty-day
period, after which cell phone provider Sprint sent e-mails, directly to the officer’s phone,
containing longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates and a link to a map indicating the phone’s
location).
341. See In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir.
2013) (refusing to “address situations where the Government surreptitiously installs spyware on
a target’s phone or otherwise hijacks the phone’s GPS, with or without the service provider’s
help”).
342. See United States v. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp 3d 896, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (recognizing
website and cell phone apps as location tracking methods); see also Brian X. Chen, When You
Should (and Shouldn’t) Share Your Location Using a Smartphone, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/technology/personaltech/using-location-sharingapps.html [https://perma.cc/K92G-CKTD].
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phone location through smartphone apps, including apps designed for
human resources purposes and employers’ individual apps. Many of the
largest employers in the United States,343 for example, have apps that can
be downloaded from the Google Play Store that request access to a user’s
location information upon download.344 Presumably, when a user
consents to such data capture, the employer is capable of tracking the
location of that user’s phone.345
One popular timekeeping app, Humanity’s “Time Clock,” is designed
to capture not only the times an employee is reportedly working, but also
the location of an employee’s cell phone every time she logs in and out
of the app.346 Every time a Time Clock user opens the app on her
smartphone, before she can “Clock In,” she is provided the following
message: “Please enable GPS on your device, if it’s not already turned
ON, because it is required for clocking In and Out.”347 After the user
clicks
“Clock
In,”
the
app
reminds
the
user
that
“‘https://www.humanity.com’ Would Like to Use Your Current
Location.”348 When the user clicks “Ok,” the app displays a map of the

343. See Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA TODAY (Aug.
22, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/
2680249/ [https://perma.cc/F9F5-9DGR] (reporting the 10 largest American employers,
beginning with the largest, as Walmart, Yum! Brands, Inc., McDonald’s Corp., International
Business Machines (IBM), United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), Target Corp., Kroger Co., Home
Depot Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., and General Electric Co.); see also Jennifer Calfas, The 6
Biggest Employers in the U.S. Right Now, TIME (Apr. 27, 2017), http://time.com/
money/4754123/biggest-us-companies/ [https://perma.cc/5EPU-2ZUE] (reporting the five largest
employers in the United States, beginning with the largest, as Walmart, Kroger, Home Depot,
IBM, and McDonald’s).
344. On March 12, 2018, the author installed the apps of five of the largest U.S. employers
on his Android smartphone: Walmart, Kroger, Home Depot, Target, and McDonald’s. All five of
those apps requested to track the location of the author’s phone almost immediately upon install.
345. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 3 (2015) (reporting that smartphone apps are often designed
to permit transaction-based data collection and location tracking). See generally FED. TRADE
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data -brokers-call-transparencyaccountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V5W-QHVM] (reporting information and findings of the FTC in a study of
nine data brokers regarding their practices related to the collection and use of consumer data).
346. See Online Time Clock Software, HUMANITY (2018) https://www.humanity.com/
timeclock [https://perma.cc/6GB3-CCA5].
347. The author’s wife, who works remotely, is required by her employer to use the
Humanity “Time Clock” app every time she logs in to work. In March 2018, the author used the
Time Clock app on his wife’s iPhone to complete the login process, which is accurately described
herein.
348. See supra note 347.
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phone’s nearby area and asks the user to confirm that the map accurately
depicts her current location.349
Because there is no trespassory invasion of an employee’s cell phone
under these circumstances, gathering an employee’s physical location
through an app like Time Clock will trigger Fourth Amendment
protection only if an employee can demonstrate a legitimate expectation
of privacy in her use of the app,350 an analysis that is fact-specific and
based on the totality of circumstances in a given case.351 In the
employment context, expectations of privacy often depend on whether an
employee has been notified of and consented to the monitoring at issue.352
Where an employee has consented to a particular form of monitoring, it
is nearly impossible for her to expect privacy in that action.353 Moreover,
even assuming a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, employee
consent will impact the reasonableness of the employer’s actions under
the second step of Fourth Amendment analysis, and may alternatively
impact whether the employer’s action would be deemed “offensive”
under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.354
These consent-based principles likely apply to timekeeping apps that
track a user’s location, given that every time an employee logs in or out
of apps like Time Clock, she willingly agrees to permit the tracking of
her phone’s location. Such consent will, in turn, eliminate any privacybased claim the employee might assert. Coupled with the employee’s
consent, the third-party assumption of risk doctrine would likely prevent
349. See supra note 347.
350. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (“Situations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”
(emphasis omitted)).
351. As one court put it, “when a defendant takes possession of a piece of property on which
a GPS device has already been installed, the continued monitoring of [the] device” would not be
a “search” of that particular defendant under the trespassory test, but may constitute a “search” of
the defendant under the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, depending, of course, on the
specific facts of the case. United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027–28
(D. Minn. 2012), aff’d, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine
and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” (emphasis added)).
352. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
354. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), illustrates the significance of consent in
the employment context as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate reasonableness inquiry.
There, in finding the search of Quon’s text messages reasonable, the Court reasoned, in part, that
Quon had been informed his text messages were subject to auditing and thus had “received no
assurances of privacy” in his pager messages. Id. at 761–62. This limited expectation of privacy
“lessened the risk that the [city’s] review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life,”
making it relatively unintrusive. Id. at 762–63.
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an employee from claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in such
data when it has been willingly conveyed in this particular manner, as it
would be difficult for an employee to argue that such information had not
been voluntarily conveyed to her employer through the timekeeping app,
which has an obvious purpose of collecting employment-related data.355
Given this combination of consent and assumption of risk, tracking an
employee’s location through a timekeeping app is generally not
unlawful.356
Finally, because wholesale employee tracking for timekeeping
purposes replaces traditional methods of clocking in and clocking out that
have been used for decades, it constitutes a form of tracking for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, for which employers are provided
great latitude. In discussing such non-investigatory searches, the Court in
O’Connor declared that public employers should be afforded “wide
latitude” to conduct such searches for “work-related, noninvestigatory
reasons” in order “[t]o ensure the efficient and proper operation of the
agency.”357 Accordingly, when employee tracking is performed for a
“work-related” purpose, particularly when it is done to improve the
efficiency of operations—as is the case with most time-keeping apps—
the “wide latitude” that must be afforded employers would seemingly
justify an across-the-board monitoring of employees’ locations.
Although tracking an employee’s location through a timekeeping app
is generally not unlawful, the analysis may change somewhat with respect
to location tracking via an employer’s individual app. This is because,
unlike apps designed specifically for timekeeping purposes, such broadbased employer apps generally do not distinguish between on-duty and
off-duty activity, making them more invasive of privacy.358
This leaves only the scenario of tracking an individual employee via
cell phone in the context of a workplace misconduct investigation. On
355. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”). For timekeeping apps in particular, the obvious connection between the app’s
employment-related function and the data generated by the app, including the phone’s location
information, should distinguish the case from Carpenter v. United States, which involved a far
more comprehensive and “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by
wireless carriers” for a much more general business purpose. See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018).
When an employer utilizes other apps to track an employee’s location in this manner, such as an
employer’s general app that anyone, including employees and customers, can access, the
assumption of risk argument carries less force.
356. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (“We hold only that a warrant is required in the rare
case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.”).
357. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987).
358. Cf. supra notes 292–319 and accompanying text (emphasizing that GPS tracking by an
employer becomes more defensible when the employer avoids collecting data while its employees
are off-duty).
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this issue, it is difficult to imagine an employer using any method of cell
phone tracking only with respect to a particular employee. Accordingly,
where cell phone location data is used in the context of an employee
misconduct investigation, it would likely be in the manner used in
Carniol—that is, where the employer simply reviews a batch of data it
had previously collected on a widescale basis, with employee consent, for
legitimate business reasons.359 And, as in Carniol, because such data
would have been lawfully acquired, possessed, and owned by the
employer, nothing would prevent the employer from reviewing its data
to determine whether a particular employee engaged in misconduct, in
which case disciplinary proceedings may commence despite any Fourth
Amendment challenge.360
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the tracking of employees through both
GPS and smartphones, conduct that may cause disgruntled employees to
sue for an invasion of privacy. Employers will have a much stronger
defense against such claims when they use either tracking method to
monitor an entire segment of employees for legitimate business reasons,
rather than as part of an investigation into individual employee
malfeasance. In addition, notifying employees in advance of any
surveillance program, such as through a written GPS tracking policy, and
limiting the scope of any surveillance to avoid collecting data regarding
employees’ off duty conduct, will help avoid liability for such claims.

359. See supra notes 292–319 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text.
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